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I.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, reverse or annul the final judgment and
conviction rendered by the Third Judicial Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah in this
criminal case. Rule 26(2)(a) Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1989) (Addendum 1), and
Judicial Code §78-2a-3(2)(f) U.C.A. (1953 as amended) (Addendum 2).

n.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether appellant's constitutional rights as guaranteed by the United States

Constitution, Fourth Amendment, as well as Article 1, Sect. 14 of the Utah Constitution were
violated by the investigatory detention which took longer than necessary to effect the purpose
of the stop? State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d. 880 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), State v. Grovier. 808
P.2d. 133 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Davis. 821 P.2d. 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); United States
Constitution. Fourth Amendment: Article 1. §14 of the Utah Constitution.
2. Whether the Circuit Court Judge erred in denying appellant's motion to Suppress
evidence obtained after appellant's impermissible detention? State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d. 880
(Utah App. 1990), State v. Grovier. 808 P.2d. 133 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Davis. 821
P.2d. 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); United States Constitution. Fourth Amendment: Article 1. §14
of the Utah Constitution.
1

III.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. The standard of review for findings of fact underlying "a Trial Court's decision on a
Motion to Suppress is the "clearly erroneous" standard. State v. Marshall, at 882 and State v.
Grovier. at 135, 136.
IVe
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
A. Constitutional Provisions
1. United States Constitution, 4th Amendment (Addendum No. 3).
2. Article 1, §14 of the Utah Constitution (Addendum No. 4).
B. Rules of Appellate Procedure
1. Rule 11, The Record on Appeal (Addendum No. 5).
2. Rule 24, Briefs (Addendum No. 6).
V.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is a criminal appeal of the Third Judicial Circuit Court's decision denying
defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence in a DUI case (Addendum 7).
B. Course of Proceedings
On November 27, 1992, defendant filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence in a DUI Charge
with Supporting Points and Authorities (Addendum 8).
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On March 18, 1993, an Evidentiary Hearing was heard by the Third Judicial Circuit
Court regarding defendant's Motion to Suppress (Addendum 9).
On March 29, 1993, plaintiff filed its Response to Motion to Suppress Evidence
(Addendum 10).
On April 6, 1993, in response to plaintiffs Response, defendant filed a pleading entitled
Motion to Suppress Evidence in DUI Charge (Addendum No, 11).
On April 12, 1993, the Third Judicial Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
denied defendant's Motion to Suppress (Addendum 7).
On April 16, 1993, the Third Judicial Circuit Court reaffirmed its decision (Addendum
12).
On June 17, 1993, defendant Heidi Rock entered a conditional plea of guilty to the DUI
charge, specifically reserving the Appellate issues arising out of defendant's Motion to Suppress
(Addendum 13 at 2, 3 and 4).
C. Disposition at Trial Court
The Trial Court denied defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence in a DUI Charge
(Addendum 7). A conditional plea of guilty to the DUI charge was entered June 17, 1993,
specifically reserving the Appellate issues arising out of defendant's Motion to Suppress
Evidence in a DUI Charge (Addendum 13, pages 2, 3 & 4).
VI.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT - FACTS
An investigatory detention must be "temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effect the purpose of the stop." State v. Davis. 821 P.2d. 9, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)

3

(Addendum No. 14).
On or about July 19, 1992, at 2:05 to 2:10 am, Heidi Rock was stopped by Officer Jed
Hurst (Addendum 9, pages 6 & 9). Officer Hurst was off-duty at the time of the stop
(Addendum 9, page 7). Officer Hurst had Heidi Rock perform two field tests, including the
horizontal gaze nystagmus and the hand-slap test (Addendum 9, page 7). Following the two
field tests, Officer Hurst did not believe he had enough probable cause for an arrest as his usual
practice is to give four or five field sobriety tests (Addendum 9, page 19). Officer Hurst could
have requested Heidi Rock to perform a third, fourth and fifth field sobriety test without delay
and make a determination concerning probable cause to arrest Heidi Rock for DUI, but did not
want to (Addendum 9, page 19). Officer Hurst had the skill, ability and training to conduct field
sobriety tests (Addendum 9, page 19).

Heidi Rock's detention was prolonged five to ten

minutes while they waited for Officer Isakson to arrive at the scene (Addendum 9, pages 20 and
22).

During the prolonged detention, no investigation nor further field tests took place

(Addendum 9, page 20). Heidi Rock was not free to leave while waiting for Officer Isakson to
arrive (Addendum 9, page 20). The only reason claimed for the prolonged detention was to
reduce the overtime pay to the Police Department (Addendum 9, page 20).

Following Officer

Isakson's arrival, Officer Hurst remained at the scene and observed all of the field tests
conducted by Officer Isakson, which included tests previously performed by Heidi Rock during
Officer Hurst's partial investigation (Addendum 9, page 8). Nearly one hour following the
initial stop, Officer Hurst continued to remain present at the scene of the stop until 3:00 a.m.,
and personally performed the inventory search and impound of Ms. Rock's vehicle (Addendum
9, pages 9 and 10). Officer Hurst was qualified to conduct sufficient field tests to determine

4

whether probable cause existed to arrest Heidi Rock, in which case, he could have arrested Heidi
Rock and delivered her to another officer at the scene without delay (Addendum 9, page 13).
The investigatory detention of Heidi Rock was unnecessarily delayed and lasted longer than was
necessary to effect the purpose of the stop State v. Davis. 821 P.2d. 9, 12 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) (Addendum 14).
VIL
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
THE INVESTIGATORY DETENTION OF HEIDI ROCK LASTED
LONGER THAN NECESSARY TO EFFECT THE PURPOSE OF THE STOP.
In State v. Marshall, this court stated "the protective shield of the Fourth Amendment
applies when an officer stops an automobile on a highway and detains its occupants. State v.
Marshall. 791 P.2d., 880, 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), citing State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d. 972, 975
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (Addendum 15). The Constitutional protections guaranteed by the United
States and Utah Constitutions against unreasonable seizures apply here since Heidi Rock was
stopped by the officer and was not free to leave (Addendums 1, 2, and 12, pages 6 & 20). The
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution, guarantee a fundamental right to citizens to be free from unreasonable seizures
(Addendums 1 and 2). As such she could not be subject to an unreasonable and unnecessarily
lengthy investigatory detention. The detention of Heidi Rock violates both the United States and
Utah Constitutions to be free from unreasonable seizures.

5

In State v. Davis, the court stated:
Moreover, an investigatory detention must be "temporary and last no longer than
is necessary to effect the purpose of the stop." State v. Davis. 821 P.2d. 9, 12 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991), citing State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d. 616, 617 (Utah 1987) (citing United
States v. Merritt. 736 F.2d. 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1142, 106
S.Ct. 2250, 90 L.Ed. 2d. 696 (1986)) (emphasis added).
The cases of State v. Grovier and State v. Marshall both focus "not on the length of the
detention alone, but on "whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was
likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain
the defendant." State v. Grovier. 808 P.2d. 133, 136 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), State v. Marshall.
791 P.2d. 880, 884 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added) (Addendum 16). The investigatory
detention to determine by field tests whether Heidi Rock had violated a DUI law was
unreasonable for two reasons. First, the investigatory detention lasted longer than necessary to
effect the purpose of the stop. Officer Hurst had the skill and training to conduct the complete
investigation without delay (Addendum 9, page 19). Officer Hurst did not diligently pursue the
investigation when he chose to discontinue the investigation in order to wait for Officer Isakson
to appear at the scene QxL at 20). Officer Hurst could have called for an on-duty officer to
appear at the scene and at the same time continue with the investigation (Id. at 19). The
detention, therefore, took longer than necessary to effect the purpose of the stop and was,
therefore, unreasonable.
Secondly, the investigatory detention was unreasonable since there was no legitimate
reason to prolong the investigation. Officer Hurst claimed that the reason for the prolonged
detention was to reduce the overtime pay to the Police Department (Id. at 20). In fact, Officer
Hurst's actions were inconsistent with the reason given when he continued to remain at the scene
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of the stop for nearly one hour, and personally performed the inventory search and impound of
Ms. Rock's vehicle (Id at 9 & 10). The interest in reducing overtime pay was not served. The
interest in reducing overtime charges to the Police Department could have been served without
prolonging Heidi Rock's detention. The investigation could have completed without delay. In
the event of an arrest, Heidi Rock could have been delivered to another officer responding to
the scene (Id. at 13). In that manner, the detention would have taken no longer than necessary
to effect the purpose of the stop and Officer Hurst's off-duty time would have terminated upon
Officer Isakson's arrival at the scene thereby satisfying the Police Department's interest.

vm.
CONCLUSION
The investigatory detention to determine whether Heidi Rock was operating a motor
vehicle in violation of Utah's DUI statute took longer than necessary. Officer Hurst was trained
and skilled in conducting field sobriety tests and should have continued conducting the
investigation during which time Officer Isakson was heading to the scene. Officer Hurst could
then have completed the investigation witout delay and either arrested or released her. If
arrested, Heidi Rock could have been delivered to Officer Isakson without further involvement
by Officer Hurst. In that manner, the investigatory detention of Heidi Rock would have been
no longer than necessary.
The reason given by Officer Hurst for the delay in the investigation was concern
regarding overtime charges to the Police Department. However, Officer Hurst's actions in
remaining at the scene for nearly one hour following Officer Isakson's arrival, and then
performing the inventory search and impound of Ms. Rock's vehicle were inconsistent with the
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the interests of the Police Department. The interests of the Police Department would have been
best served by following the procedure described above. More importantly, the detention of
Heidi Rock would not have been longer than necessary.
The facts support a finding that Heidi Rock's constitutional rights as guaranteed under
the United States and Utah Constitutions against unreasonable seizures were violated and require
a reversal of the Trial Court's decision.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2J_ day of September, 1993.

^>7
itehel Zager
/
)
Attorney for Appellant ^—^
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Addendum Number 1
Rule 26(2)(a) Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure (1989)

661
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Rule 26. Appeals.
(1) An appeal is taken by filing with the clerk of
the court from which the appeal is taken a notice of
appeal, stating the order or judgment appealed from,
and by serving a copy of it on the adverse party or his
attorney of record. Proof of service of the copy shall be
filed with the court.
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from:
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether
by verdict or plea;
(b) an order made, after judgment, affecting
the substantial rights of the defendant;
(c) an interlocutory order when, upon petition
for review, the appellate court decides that the
appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution.
(3) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution
from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal;
(b) an order arresting judgment;
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double jeopardy or denial of
a speedy trial;
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or
any part of it invalid;

Addendum Number 2
Judicial Code, Section 78-2a-3(2)(f)
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended)

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of
political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under
Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except
those from the small claims department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record in criminal cases, except those involving a
charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal
cases, except those involving a conviction of a
first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree
or capital felony;

Addendum Number 3
The United States Constitution
Fourth Amendment

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AMENDMENT IV
(Unreasonable searches and seizures.)
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Addendum Number 4
The Utah State Constitution
Article I, Section 14

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
ARTICLE 1, §14
(Unreasonable searches forbidden - issuance of warrant.)
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.

Addendum Number 5
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11
Record on Appeal

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Rule 11

submitted to the court for consideration and an appropriate order. The time
for taking other steps in the appellate procedure is suspended pending disposition of a motion to affirm or reverse or dismiss.
(e) Ruling of court. The court, upon its own motion, and on such notice as
it directs, may dismiss an appeal or petition for review if the court lacks
jurisdiction; or may summarily affirm the judgment or order which is the
subject of review, if it plainly appears that no substantial question is presented; or may summarily reverse in cases of manifest error.
(f) Deferral of ruling. As to any issue raised by a motion for summary
disposition, the court may defer its ruling until plenary presentation and
consideration of the case.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Dismissal by court.
Summary affirmance.
rious
Time for
filing.
Dismissal by court
Appeal appropriate for summary disposition
(i.e., dismissal) on court's own motion. See
Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct
™"
Summary affirmance.
Summary affirmance under this rule is a determination of the appeal on its merits, after
the parties have been afforded a full and ade-

quate opportunity to present relevant arguments and authorities. An appellate court's rejection of appellant's contentions as unmerito^ right o f a p p e a L
d o e 8 n o t d e n y him
Hernandez v. Hayward, 764 P.2d 993 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988); State v. Palmer, 786 P.2d 248
(Utah Ct App. 1990) (decided under former
Rule 10, Utah R. Ct App.).
Time

for

fflift0>

A motion for summary disposition that is
clearly meritorious supports a suspension of
the time limitation contained in this rule.
Bailey v. Adams, 798 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).

Rule 11. The record on appeal.
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers and exhibits filed in the trial court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index
prepared by the clerk of the trial court, and where available the docket sheet,
shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases. However, with respect to
papers only those prescribed under paragraph (d) of this rule shall be transmitted to the appellate court.
(b) Pagination and indexing of record. Immediately upon filing of the
notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial court shall paginate all of the original
papers filed in that court in chronological order and shall prepare an alphabetical index of those papers. The index shall contain a reference to the date
on which the paper was filed in the trial court and the starting page of the
record on which the paper will be found.
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in
the event that more than one appeal is taken, each appellant, shall comply
with the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall take any
other action necessary to enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and
transmit the record. A single record shall be transmitted.
(d) Papers and exhibits on appeal.
(1) Criminal cases. All of the original papers in a criminal case shall
be included by the clerk of the trial court as part of the record on appeal.
(2) Civil cases. In all civil cases, the record shall remain in the custody
of the clerk of the trial court, as set forth in Rule 12(b)(2), during preparation and filing of briefs.
439
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The clerk of the trial court shall establish rules and procedures for checking
out the record, after pagination, for use by the parties in briefing.
(A) Civil cases with short records. In civil cases where all the
original papers total fewer than 300 pages, all of the original papers
will be transmitted to the appellate court upon completion of the
filing of briefs by the parties, as set forth in Rule 12(b)(2). In such
cases, the appellant shall serve upon the clerk of the trial court,
simultaneously with the filing of appellant's reply brief, notice of the
date on which appellant's reply brief was filed. If appellant does not
intend to file a reply brief, appellant shall notify the clerk of the trial
court of that fact within 30 days of the filing of appellee's brief.
(B) All other civil cases. In all other civil cases where the original papers are or exceed 300 pages, all parties shall file with the
clerk of the trial court, within 10 days after briefing is completed, a
joint or separate designation of those papers referred to in their respective briefs. Only those designated papers and the following, to
the extent applicable, shall be transmitted to the clerk of the appellate court by the clerk of the trial court:
(i) the pleadings as defined in Rule 7(a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure;
(ii) the pretrial order, if any;
(iii) the final judgment, order, or interlocutory order from
which the appeal is taken;
(iv) other orders sought to be reviewed, if any;
(v) any supporting opinion, findings of fact or conclusions of
law filed or delivered by the trial court;
(vi) the motion, response, and accompanying memoranda upon
which the court rendered judgment, if any;
(vii) jury instructions given, if any;
(viii) jury verdicts and interrogatories, if any;
(ix) the notice of appeal,
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice
to appellee if partial transcript is ordered.
(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal, the appellant shall request from the reporter a
transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the
appellant deems necessary. The request shall be in writing, and, within
the same period, a copy shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and
the clerk of the appellate court. If no such parts of the proceedings are to
be requested, within the same period the appellant shall file a certificate
to that effect with the clerk of the trial court and a copy with the clerk of
the appellate court. If there was no reporter but the proceedings were
otherwise recorded, the appellant shall request from a court transcriber,
certified in accordance with the rules and procedures of the Judicial
Council, a transcript of such parts of the proceeding not already on file as
the appellant deems necessary. By stipulation of the parties approved by
the appellate court, a person other than a certified court transcriber may
transcribe a recorded hearing. The clerk of the appellate court shall, upon
request, provide a list of all certified court transcribers. The transcriber is
subject to all of the obligations imposed on reporters by these rules.
440
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Rule 11

(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged
finding or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant
to such finding or conclusion.
(3) Statement of issues; cross-designation by appellee. Unless the
entire transcript is to be included, the appellant shall, within 10 days
after filing the notice of appeal, file a statement of the issues that will be
presented on appeal and shall serve on the appellee a copy of the request
or certificate and a copy of the statement. If the appellee deems a transcript of other parts of the proceedings to be necessary, the appellee shall,
within 10 days after the service of the request or certificate and the
statement of the appellant, file and serve on the appellant a designation
of additional parts to be included. Unless within 10 days after service of
such designation the appellant has requested such parts and has so notified the appellee, the appellee may within the following 10 days either
request the parts or move in the trial court for an order requiring the
appellant to do so.
(4) Payment of reporter. At the time of the request, a party shall
make satisfactory arrangements with the reporter or transcriber for payment of the cost of the transcript.
(f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the record on
appeal as defined in paragraph (a) of this rule, the parties may prepare and
sign a statement of the case, showing how the issues presented by the appeal
arose and were decided in the trial court and setting forth only so many of the
facts averred and proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision
of the issues presented. If the statement conforms to the truth, it, together
with such additions as the trial court may consider necessary fully to present
the issues raised by the appeal, shall be approved by the trial court. The clerk
of the trial court shall transmit the statement to the clerk of the appellate
court within the time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The clerk of the trial court
shall transmit the index of the record to the clerk of the appellate court upon
approval of the statement by the trial court.
(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made
or when transcript is unavailable. If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, the
appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the
best available means, including recollection. The statement shall be served on
the appellee, who may serve objections or propose amendments within 10 days
after service. The statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall
be submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval and, as settled and
approved, shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on
appeal.
(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as
to whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the
difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made
to conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from
the record by error or accident or is misstated, the parties by stipulation, the
trial court, or the appellate court, either before or after the record is transmitted, may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected and if necessary that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. The moving
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party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the parties
a statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days after service, any party
may serve objections to the proposed changes. All other questions as to the
form and content of the record shall be presented to the appellate court.
Advisory Committee Note, — The rule is
amended to make applicable m the Supreme
Court a procedure of the Court of Appeals for
preparing a transcript where the record is
maintained by an electronic recording device.

The mle is modified slightly from the former
Court of Appeals rule to make it the appellant's responsibility, not the clerk's responsibility to arrange for the preparation of the
transcript.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Correction or modification.
—Supplemental record.
Notice of transmission.
Purpose.
—Supplementation demed.
Evidence.
Incomplete record.
Statement where transcript unavailable
—Adequacy of rule's procedures.
Right to appeal.
Transcript.
—Factual matters.
—Purpose of rule.
Cited.
Correction or modification.
—Supplemental record.
In considering a motion to supplement the
record, the appellate court should evaluate several factors. These include the need for the supplemental material, prior opportunity to introduce the supplemental material, and length of
the resulting delay. Under appropriate circumstances and in the interest of judicial economy,
the court will deny a motion to supplement the
record. Jeschke v. Willis, 793 P.2d 428 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).
The trial court properly supplemented the
record with respect to the circumstances surrounding the question of whether defendant
waived his right to a jury trial, when the trial
court had the parties submit proffers of evidence m the form of affidavits to the trial judge
stating the recollection each had of the circumstances surrounding the waiver. State v.
Moosman, 794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990).
Notice of transmission.
Although this rule does not require notice to
the parties of transmittal of any supplemental
records, it is advisable to give notice of any
proposed action that may affect the parties'
rights or responsive procedures. William C.
Moore & Co. v. Sanchez, 6 Utah 2d 309, 313
P.2d 461 (1957).

Purpose.
It is not improper for the Supreme Court to
consider a supplemental record for purposes of
determining if the trial court's ruling was supported by competent evidence Bawden &
Assocs. v. Smith, 646 P.2d 711 (Utah 1982)
—Supplementation denied.
Supreme Court declined to permit supplementation of the record to show that the objections required by Rule 51, U R.C P , were
made, where the exact nature of the objections
made was not clear, and the parties could not
agree upon and the trial judge could not recall
specific details of the proposed instructions
that were rejected or modified. Hansen v Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988).
Evidence.
In essence, this rule directs counsel to provide the appellate court with all evidence relevant to the issues raised on appeal. Sampson v
Richms, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct. App ), cert
denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989).
Because counsel failed to provide the Court
of Appeals with all relevant evidence bearing
on the issues raised on appeal, as required by
Subdivision (e)(2), the court could only presume that the judgment was supported by sufficient evidence. State v. Nine Thousand One
Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars, 791 P2d 213
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Intermountain Power
Agency v. Bowers-Irons Recreation Land &
Cattle Co., 786 P.2d 250 (Utah Ct. App 1990)
Incomplete record.
If the record before the Court of Appeals is
incomplete, the court is unable to review the
evidence as a whole and must therefore presume that the verdict was supported by admissible and competent evidence. Sampson v
Richms, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct. App ), cert
denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989); Horton v
Gem State Mut., 794 P.2d 847 (Utah Ct App
1990).
Statement where transcript unavailable.
—Adequacy of rule's procedures.
Right to appeal.
To prove that the loss of the reporter's notes
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from an earlier hearing effectively denied an
appellant his constitutional right to appeal the
judgment of that hearing, the appellant must
show that the procedures provided by this rule
for reconstructing and settling the record are
inadequate. Emig v. Hayward, 703 P.2d 1043
(Utah 1985).
Transcript
—Factual matters.
The Supreme Court cannot resolve or undertake to determine appeals involving factual

Rule 12

matters without a transcript of the testimony.
Sawyers v. Sawyers, 558 P.2d 607 (Utah 1976).
—Purpose of rule.
x ^ p u r p o s e 0f this rule is to avoid the
court's attempting to recreate, based upon conflkting testimony of counsel, what oral arguments were made by counsel at a law and motion hearing. Guardian State Bank v. Humphreys, 762 P.2d 1084 (Utah 1988).
Cited in Prudential Capital Group Co. v.
Mattson, 148 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Ct. App.
1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error §§ 397 to 544.
C.J.S. — 4A C J.S. Appeal and Error §§ 680
to 1216.
A.L.R. — Court reporter's death or disabil-

ity prior to transcribing notes as grounds for
reversal or new trial, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049.
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «= 493
et seq.

Rule 12. Transmission of the record.
(a) Duty of reporter to prepare and file transcript; notice to appellate
court. Upon receipt of a request for a transcript, the reporter shall file with
the clerk of the appellate court an acknowledgment that the request has been
received, the date of its receipt, the date on which the reporter expects to file
the transcript, and whether satisfactory arrangements for payment have been
made. The transcript shall be completed within 30 days of receipt of the
request. The reporter may file a motion for an enlargement of time with the
clerk of the appellate court. The clerk of the appellate court may grant an
enlargement of time upon a showing by the reporter of good cause. The reporter shall give notice of the motion for enlargement of time to the parties.
The clerk of the appellate court shall enter the decision upon the motion in the
docket and notify the parties. In the event of the failure of the reporter to file
the transcript within the time allowed, the clerk of the appellate court shall
notify the trial court judge and take such other steps as may be directed by the
appellate court, including but not limited to an order relieving the reporter of
all regular duties until such time as the transcript is completed. Upon completion of the transcript, the reporter shall file it with the clerk of the trial court
and shall notify the clerk of the appellate court that the transcript has been
filed.
(b) Transmittal of record on appeal to appellate court; duty of trial
court clerk*
(1) Duty of trial court clerk in criminal cases. In criminal cases, all
of the original papers and the index prepared pursuant to Rule 1Kb) will
be transmitted by the clerk of the trial court to the clerk of the appellate
court upon completion of the transcript under paragraph (a) above or, if
there is no transcript, within 20 days of the filing of the notice of appeal.
(2) Duty of trial court clerk in civil cases. In civil cases, unless
otherwise ordered by the appellate court, the record shall remain in the
custody of the trial court clerk during the preparation and filing of briefs.
When the transcript is completed pursuant to paragraph (a) above, the
clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit a certified copy of the

Addendum Number 6
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24
Requirements of Appellant's Brief
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Any party may file a response in opposition to a motion within 10 days after
service of the motion; however, the court may, for good cause shown, dispense
with, shorten or extend the time for responding to any motion,
(b) Determination of motions for procedural orders. Notwithstanding
the provisions of paragraph (a) of this rule as to motions generally, motions
for procedural orders which do not substantially affect the rights of the parties
or the ultimate disposition of the appeal, including any motion under Rule
22(b), may be acted upon at any time, without awaiting a response. Pursuant
to rule or order of the court, motions for specified types of procedural orders
may be disposed of by the clerk. The court may review a disposition by the
clerk upon motion of a party or upon its own motion.
(c) Power of a single justice or judge to entertain motions. In addition
to the authority expressly conferred by these rules or by law, a single justice
or judge of the court may entertain and may grant or deny any request for
relief which under these rules may properly be sought by motion, except that
a single justice or judge may not dismiss or otherwise determine an appeal or
other proceeding, and except that the court may provide by order or rule that
any motion or class of motions must be acted upon by the court. The action of a
single justice or judge may be reviewed by the court.
(d) Form of papers; number of copies.
(1) Except for motions to enlarge time, five copies shall be filed with
the original in the Supreme Court, and four copies shall be filed with the
original in the Court of Appeals, but the court may require that additional copies be furnished. Only the original of a motion to enlarge time
shall be filed.
(2) Motions and other papers shall be typewritten on opaque, unglazed
paper 8V2 by 11 inches in size. The text shall be in type not smaller than
ten characters per inch. Lines of text shall be double spaced and shall be
upon one side of the paper only. Consecutive sheets shall be attached at
the upper left margin.
(3) A motion or other paper shall contain a caption setting forth the
name of the court, the title of the case, the docket number, and a brief
descriptive title indicating the purpose of the paper. The attorney shall
sign all papers filed with the court with his or her individual name. The
attorney shall give his or her business address, telephone number, and
Utah State Bar number in the upper left hand corner of the first page of
every paper filed with the court except briefs. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign any paper filed with the court and state
the party's address and telephone number.

Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under
appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or
agency whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where
the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties.
The list should be set out on a separate page which appears immediately
inside the cover.
(2) A table of contents, with page references.
d*d
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(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review and the standard of
appellate review for each issue with supporting authority for each issue.
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative shall be set out verbatim with
the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy,
the citation alone will suffice, and in that event, the provision shall be set
forth as provided in paragraph (f) of this rule.
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the
court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for
review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record (see paragraph

fe)).

(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually
made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the
heading under which the argument is arranged.
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, with citations
to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that a statement of the
issues or of the case need not be made unless the appellee is dissatisfied with
the statement of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief
in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the crossappeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in
the opposing brief. No further briefs may be filed except with leave of the
appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their
briefe and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such
designations as "appellant" and "appellee". It promotes clarity to use the
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the
actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the
injured person," "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the
pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 1Kb), to pages of
the reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement of the evidence or
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g).
References to exhibits shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is made to
evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made
to the pages of the transcript at which the evidence was identified, offered,
and received or rejected.

Rule 24
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(f) Reproduction of opinions, statutes, rules, regulations, documents,
etc.
(1) Any opinion, memorandum of decision, findings of fact, conclusions
of law, or order pertaining to the issues on appeal and any jury instructions or other part of the record of central importance to the determination of the appeal shall be reproduced in the brief or in an addendum to
the brief
(2) If determination of the issues presented requires the study of statutes, rules, regulations, etc., or relevant parts thereof, to the extent not
set forth under subparagraph (a)(6) of this rule, they shall be reproduced
in the brief or in an addendum at the end, or they may be supplied to the
court in pamphlet form.
(g) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs
shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive
of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (f) of this rule.
(h) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the
party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the
purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the
court otherwise orders. The brief of the appellee shall contain the issues and
arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of
the appellant.
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated
for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and
any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of
another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original
letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing
and shall be similarly limited.
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs
which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer.
(1) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and
shall comply with Rule 27.
Advisory Committee Note. — The brief
must now contain for each issue raised on ap-

peal, a statement of the applicable standard of
review and citation of supporting authority.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
a reply brief will not be considered on appeal,
although the court, in its discretion, may decided a case upon any points that its proper
disposition may require, even if first raised in
a reply brief. Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l
Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980).

ANALYSIS

Constitutional arguments.
Contents.
—Inappropriate language.
—Issues raised.
Reply brief.
—Statement of facts with citation to record.
Failure to contain.
Failure to file.
—Defective appeal.
Properly documented argument.
Cited.

—Statement of
record.

Constitutional arguments.
In order to make an argument for an innovative interpretation of a state constitutional
provision textually similar to a federal provision, the following points should be developed
and supported with authority and analysis.
First, counsel should offer analysis of the
unique context in which Utah's constitution
developed with regard to the issue at hand.
Second, counsel should demonstrate that state
appellate courts regularly interpret even
textually similar state constitutional provisions in a manner different from federal interpretations of the United States Constitution
and that it is entirely proper to do so in our
federal system. Third, citation should be made
to authority from other states supporting the
particular construction urged by counsel. State
v. Bobo, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 67 (Ct. App. 1990).

facts

with

citation

to

Failure to contain.
The Supreme Court need not, and will not,
consider any facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the record. Uckerman v. Lincoln
N a t l Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978).
The Supreme Court will assume the correctness of the judgment in a criminal trial if counsel on appeal does not comply with the requirements as to making a concise statement of
facts and citation of the pages in the record
where they are supported. State v. Tucker, 657
P.2d 755 (Utah 1982).
If a party fails to make a concise statement
of the facts and citation of the pages in the
record where those facts are supported, the
court will assume the correctness of the judgment below. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746
P.2d 1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Fail

cfBle.

-Defective appeal.
Where defendant was convicted of operating
a motor vehicle without insurance, and 'atContents.
tempted to file his appeal pro se, but failed to
A brief must contain some support for eac
file a brief or submit a transcript of the record,
contention. State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960 N there was no reversible error presented which
(Utah 1989); State v. Reiners, 151 Utah Adv. \would permit the appellate court to reverse the
Rep. 17 (Ct. App. 1990).
judgment. State v Hanspnf 540_R2d 935 (Utah
1975).
""^
'
—Inappropriate language.
Derogatory references to others or inappro- Properly documented argument.
priate language of any kind has no place in an
Brief that was filled with burdensome, emoappellate brief and is of no assistance in at- tional, immaterial and inaccurate arguments
tempting to resolve any legitimate issues pre- did not set forth a properly documented argusented on appeal. State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296
ment as required by this rule; therefore the
(Utah 1986).
court disregarded it. Koulis v. Standard Oil
Co., 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
—Issues raised.
Reply brief.
As a general rule, an issue raised initially in

Cited in Weber v. Snyderville West, 146
Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (Ct. App. 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error §§ 684 to 690.
C.J.S. — 5 CJ.S. Appeal and Error § 1311
et seq.

Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error <*= 755
to 807.
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Addendum Number 7
Decision denying Defendant's Motion to
Suppress Evidence in a DUI Case

THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

Salt Lake City Corp,
Plaintiff,

Decision
Case No. 925020755TC

vs

Heidi Rock,
Defendant
The time for further responsive memorandum in the above entitled case having
expired, the court now renders its decision on defendant's motion to suppress and dismiss.
On the motion to suppress, the court finds that the detention of the defendant
in order to wait for an on-duty officer to complete the investigation was not unreasonable. It
served valid public interests and did not unreasonably detain the defendant. The motion to
suppress is therefore denied.
On the motion to dismiss the charge of open container, the fact that the officer
destroyed the alleged alcohol and its container would go to the weight, not the admissibility
of the evidence, and the defendant is not unduly prejudiced by the destruction. The motion
to dismiss is accordingly denied.
The matter is set for Jury Trial on the 19th of May at 9:00 a. m. No further notice
will be provided.
DATED this

y£<^ day of April, 1993.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decision was mailed
to :
TODD J. GODFREY
ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION
451 South 200 East # 125
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and
MR MITCHELL ZAGER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
3587 West 4700 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118
on the

/J?*^

day of April, 1993

a
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Addendum Number 8
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence
in a DUI Case along with Supporting
Points & Authorities

MITCHEL ZAGER - 3968
Attorney for Defendant
3587 West 4700 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118
Telephone: 801-964-6100
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

j

Plaintiff,

|

v.

I

HEIDI ROCK,

|

Defendant.

MOTION TO SUPRESS EVIDENCE
IN DUI CHARGE AND MOTION TO
DISMISS OPEN CONTAINER CHARGE

Case No. 925020755 TC

|

COMES NOW, the defendant, HEIDI ROCK, by and through her attorney of record,
MITCHEL ZAGER, and hereby moves this Honorable Court to supress all evidence after the
unreasonable and unlawful detention of HEIDI ROCK on the grounds that she was illegally
detained after performing field tests for Officer Jed Hurst; and on the basis that her
constitutional rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment, as well
as Article 1, §14 of the Utah Constitution were violated thereby. Defendant further moves this
court to dismiss the charge of open container on the basis that the State has destroyed all tangible
evidence of the alleged charge.
Based upon the Motion, Points and Authorities, and surrounding circumstances, and in
the interest of the furtherance of justice, defendant's motion should be granted.
Defendant requests that oral argument be set in this matter.

DATED this V7_ day of November, 1992.

fezc

ITCHEL ZAGER
Attorney for Defendant

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the Motion to Suppress Evidence in D.U.I.
Charge and MOtion to Dismiss Open Container Charge was sent via U.S. mail, postage prepaid, this 3*1

day of November 1992, to the following: Salt Lake City Prosecutor, 451 So.

200 East, Room 125, Salt Lake City, UT 84111.

0M^CCL4
Cindy Bruce

&U^C£J

MITCHEL ZAGER - 3968
Attorney for Defendant
3587 West 4700 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118
Telephone: 801-964-6100
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

j

Plaintiff,

j

v.

I

HEIDI ROCK,

|

Defendant.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE IN D.U.I. CHARGE AND
DISMISS OPEN CONTAINER CHARGE

Case No. 925020755 TC

I

COMES NOW the defendant, by and through her attorney, MITCHEL ZAGER, and in
support of her motion to suppress evidence in a D.U.I, charge and dismiss open container
charge, states as follows:
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On or about July 19, 1992, defendant HEIDI ROCK was stopped by Officer Hurst
for allegedly having no headlights on but only her parking lights on. See supplemental report
of Officer Hurst attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
2. HEIDI ROCK, according to Officer Hurst, had bloodshot eyes and a "faint" odor of
alcohol. See Exhibit 1 attached hereto.
3.

HEIDI ROCK was required by Officer Hurst to perform two (2) field tests.

Following her performance of the two field tests, Officer Hurst was unable to assess whether

HEIDI ROCK ... "was impaired or not." See Exhibit 1 attached hereto.
4. HEIDI ROCK returned to her vehicle and was ready to leave, but was prevented from
doing so.
5. HEIDI ROCK continued to be detained by Officer Hurst for approximately twentythree minutes from the time of the stop until Officer Isakson arrived at the scene.

Officer

Isakson required HEIDI ROCK to perform four (4) additional field tests and stated that HEIDI
ROCK had a strong odor of alcohol about her person. Following the field tests, HEIDI ROCK
was placed under arrest. See Exhibit 1 attached hereto.
6. The Officers allege that a half-full pint bottle of vodka was found behind the driver's
seat on the floor, which at inventory was found to be a one-quarter full pint bottle of vodka.
The bottle of vodka alleged by the officers was subsequently destroyed and is presently not in
evidence.
7. HEIDI ROCK, who had no previous offenses of any kind, was arrested for D.U.I,
and open container.
II.
THE OFFICER'S CONTINUED DETENTION OF HEIDI ROCK FOLLOWING
HER PERFORMANCE OF FIELD TESTS WAS UNREASONABLE AND IN
VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION, AS WELL AS ARTICLE I §14 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
The defendant HEIDI ROCK was detained longer than was reasonable in this instance
in violation of both the United States Constitution Fourth Amendment and Article I §14 of the
Utah Constitution. HEIDI ROCK allegedly was stopped for having her parking lights on instead
of her headlights.

Following her performance of field tests, Officer Hurst was unable to

conclude with probable cause that she was impaired (see Exhibit 1 attached hereto). In State v.
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conclude with probable cause that she was impaired (see Exhibit 1 attached hereto). In State v.
Marshall, the Utah Court of Appeals stated:
"The United States Supreme Court has not chosen to define a bright-line rule as to the
acceptable length of a detention because "common sense" and ordinary human experience must
govern over rigid criteria." State v. Marshall 791 P.2d 880,884 (Utah App. 1990), citing
United States v. Sharp. 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568,1575 (1985).
The Marshall court went on to say that the length of the detention is one factor as well
as whether the police investigation was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly during
which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. IcL In the instant case, Officer Hurst, a
trained law enforcement official, following his trained observations of the defendant's driving
pattern, her person, her speech and her performance on field tests, he did not believe he had
enough evidence to establish probable cause to arrest HEIDI ROCK for driving under the
influence of alcohol.

The continued detention of HEIDI ROCK to perform the same and

additional field tests by another officer, was unreasonable and'not likely to confirm nor dispel
their suspicions whether HEIDI ROCK was impaired. Officer Isakson had no greater training
and, in fact, had less insight concerning HEIDI ROCK'S condition, having not observed her
driving pattern. Having another officer re-test the defendant did not add any evidence that
Officer Hurst had not gathered through his investigation. The repeat testing of HEIDI ROCK
by another officer did not further the investigation. It simply substituted one officer's opinion
for another. Thus, the continued detention of HEIDI ROCK was unreasonable and did not
further the investigation. Following her performance of field tests for Officer Hurst HEIDI
ROCK should have been released. Her continued detention violated both the Utah and United
States Constitutions as cited and all evidence obtained following the unreasonable detention of
HEIDI ROCK as stated must be suppressed.
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III.
THE STATE DESTROYED ALL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE CHARGE
OF OPEN CONTAINER AND, THEREFORE, THE CHARGE MUST BE
DISMISSED.
The officers destroyed all alleged tangible evidence of an open container of alcohol in
the vehicle thereby preventing HEIDI ROCK from obtaining that evidence and testing it to
determine whether in fact an open container of alcohol was in her vehicle.

Without this

evidence HEIDI ROCK cannot effectively cross-examine, test, nor examine the evidence, and
as such it violates her due process rights under the United States and Utah Constitution.
The impoundment of the vehicle was also improper since the vehicle could have been
legally parked or removed by the licensed passengers in the vehicle.

The impound and

subsequent inventory search without warrant were impermissible. Therefore, the charge of open
container must be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,

MITCHEL ZAGER
Attorney for Plaintiff

r>

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the Points and Authorities in Support of Motion
to Suppress Evidence in a D.U.I. Charge and Dismiss Open Container Charge was sent via U.S.
mail, postage pre-paid, thisy /

day of November 1992, to the following: Salt Lake City

Prosecutor, 451 So. 200 East, Room 125, Salt Lake City, UT 84111.

Cindy Bruce "
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SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT - SR
NCIC ! PRIMARY OFFFNSF
i

5404 ! DUI/ALCOHOL
CLASSCTN
! FELONY?
CHANGE?
!
NO
! NO
ADDRESS OF OCCURRENCE
2 4 -} W

CASE 92-0777?;

! NCIC ! SECONDARY OFFENSE
I
(

OCCURRED
DATF
07/1.9/92
100 S

TIME
02; 15

DATE
! CASE NO,
REPORTED !
07/26/92 ! 92-077792
DAY
SUN
APT

DETAILS FIELD - DF

COUNCIL
CASE

92-077792

A/P MADE A RIGHT TURN ONTO WEST TEMPLE FROM 500 S. NORTHBOUND SHE
TMTfi THE INSIDE LANE. THE VEHICLE HAD NO HEADLIGHTS ON? PARK LIGHTS
WERE ON* I STOPPED THF VEHICLE A/P WAS DRIVING* A/P HAD BLOODSHOT GLAZED
EYKS AMD THERE WAS A FAINT ODOR OF ALCOHOL FROM HER. A/P ASKED ME REPEATED
I. Y WHY I STOPPED. I FXPIAINED TO HER THE REASON FOR THE STOP AS MANY TIMES
AS A/P ASKED. A/P WAS GOING TO START THE CAR AT ONE POINT AS IF TO LEAVE
WHILE I WAS STILL 1H THE STREET TALKING TO HER. I ASKED A/P TO PERFORM TWO
FSK'S FOR ME. A/F'S ABILITY TO FOLLOW MY INSTRUCTIONS WAS POOR, SHE
PERFORMED TFST DURING INSTRUCTION. ATTENTION SPAN WAS SHORT* KEPT ASKING
HE WHAT I WANTED HER TO DO AS I WAS EXPLAINING AND DEMONSTRATING TESTS TO
HER.
TEST 5-1 i H.G.N. EARLY ANGLE OF ONSET? JERKY PURSUIT. TEST t2l HAND
SLAP.
WAS PER
UNABLE
TO IPERFORMED
AT ALL
PLE A/P
SLAPS
SIDE.
WAS OFF DUTY
AND WITHOUT
I NEEDEDHULT1
TO ASSESS A/P'S IF A/P
WAS IMPAIRED OR NOT.IF S0> I WOULD NEFD AND ON DUTY CAR TO HANDLE THE
ARREST SO AS TO KEEP O.T. TO A MINIMUM.
ON DUTY OFFICER ISAKSON WAS DISPATCHED TO MY LOCATION AND MADE
INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENTS OF A/P WITH FST'S WHICH I WITNESSED. A/P WAS PRO
OESSED BY OFFICER ISAKSON. I IMPOUNDED A/P'S CAR. DURING THE INVENTORY I
FOUND AN OPEN 1/4-FULL PINT BOTTLE OF VODKA IN A PAPER SACK WHICH WAS L.OCA
TED BEHIND THE DRIVER'S SEAT ON THE FLOOR.
OFFICER INFORMATION FIELD - OF
ID MO./DIV
G52
REPORT STATUS
CASE CLOSED?

!
!
!
!

REPORTING OFFICER
HURST 7 JED
CLEARANCE:
EXCEPT? UNF? ARRFST?

RECEIVED IN RECORDS
DATE
TIME
07/22/92
20:3 7

rfaqp

0 0-077792

ASSISTING OFFICERS ID NO./DIV,
AGE GROUP:
ADULT?

JUVFNILE?

COMPUTER ENTRY ID
62ER

"tj^L^hcf 1

Addendum Number 9
Transcript of Hearing on 3/18/93, pages
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 19, 20, 22

1

A

The night involved in this situation.

2

Q

Can you tell us what happened that night.

3

A

I was driving on West Temple southbound

4

approaching Fifth South.

5

Q

Were you on duty?

5

A

No, I was off duty.

I was in my patrol

7

vehicle in uniform.

I saw the defendant's car making a

3

turn off of Fifth South onto West Temple going northbound,

9

made a wide turn into the inside lane, had no headlights

10

on.

I decided to stop the car and see what the problem

H

was and why the headlights weren't on.

12

Q

Why did you stop the car?

13

A

Because of the wide turn and no headlights.

14

Q

You were off duty though, correct?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

So what did you do when you decided to stop

A

She pulled up to Fourth South and made a

17
1Q

the car?

19

left turn onto Fourth South off of West Temple.

As soon

20

as she completed that turn I was right behind her.

2i

initiated my emergency lights to indicate that I wanted

22

her vehicle to pull over which didn't happen clear until

23

just before Third West on Fourth South.

I

24

Q

And what happened once the car did stop?

25

A

She pulled the car over.

I approached the
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1

vehicle on the driver's side, asked for her drivers

2

license.

3

the reasons and then she asked me several times while I

4

was talking to her why I had stopped her even as I was

5

explaining indicating that there was some problem with her

6

understanding me.

7

from the car, decided that perhaps she was intoxicated and

8

had her exit the car and had her perform two field

9

sobriety tests.

She asked me why I had stopped her.

I explained

I decided because I smelled alcohol

10

Q

What tests did you ask her to perform?

H

A

Horizontal gaze nystagmus and hand slap.

12

Q

How did she do on those tests?

13

A

She did poorly on both of them.

14

Q

What did you do at that point?

15

A

I called for an on duty car to come and

15

take care of the arrest portion of the DUI.

17

Q

Why did you call for an on duty car.

18

A

Because I was off duty and we had recently

19

had a policy that if an on duty car could handle a problem

20

that an off duty car is handling that's what they want us

2i

to do.

22
23

How long had that policy been in place at

A

I'm not sure.

this time?

24
25

Q

Probably about two or three

months.
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1

Q

Had you been on duty at all that day?

2

A

Yeah, earlier that day I had been on duty.

3

Q

How long had you been off duty?

4

A

Uh, about four hours, I think.

5

working a part time job prior to leaving —

$

contact with her.

I had been

prior to my

I was just leaving my part time job.

7

Q

Where was that?

3

A

That was at City Centre at Fourth South and

9

State Street.

IQ
H

Q

Once you made the call for another on duty

car, how long was it before another officer responded?

12

A

To the best of my recollection it was about

13

five or ten minutes.

14

Q

And who was the officer who responded?

15

A

Officer Isaacson.

15

Q

What did you observe after Officer Isaacson

A

Officer Isaacson performed some field

17

responded?

13
19

sobriety tests or had the defendant perform some field

20

sobriety tests for him.

2i

Q

Did he duplicate any of the tests you had

23

A

I believe so.

24

Q

Did you instruct him to do that?

25

A

No I did not.

22

done?
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2

Q

already conducted those tests?

3
4

A

Yeah, I told him that I had conducted a

couple of field sobriety tests.

5
6

Did you inform him at any time that you had

Q

Do you recall if you told him specifically

which tests?

7

A

I don't recall specifically.

8

Q

What time did you leave the scene of the

A

I think it was close to 3:00 o'clock once

9

stop?

10
H

the car had been impounded and taken away from there.

12
13

Q
initial stop?

14
15

How long was that after you made the

A

The initial stop was probably made at 2:05,

2:10, somewhere in that area.

15

Q

17

what did you tell him?

IB

A

When Officer Isaacson got to the scene,

I told him the reason that I had stopped

19

her and the reason that I had called him was that I had

20

performed a couple of field sobriety tests and I felt that

2i

she was impaired and shouldn't be driving.

22
23
24
25

Q

Why didn't you just arrest her at that

A

Well, because it would have taken probably

point?

2 1/2 to 3 hours for the completion of the process —
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
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the

1

intoxilyzer tests and paperwork and booking and jail.
Q

2
3

Did you have anything to do with the

impound of the car?

4

A

Yes, I did.

5

Q

Did you personally perform the impound?

6

A

Yes, I did.

7

Q

Did you find anything during that impound?

8

A

During the inventory search I found a

9
10

bottle of vodka that had about a quarter —

was about a

quarter full.

11

Q

Was the bottle open or closed?

12

A

The lid was on.

13

behind the driver's seat.

14
15

Q

What did you do with that when you found

A

I dumped out the vodka and disposed of the

it?

16
17

It was in a paper sack

bottle.
MR. ZAGER:

18

Your Honor, I am going to

19

object to the conclusion that there was vodka in the

20

bottle.

21

foundat.ion.

That1 s the issue.

THE COURT:

22
23
24
25

Q

There needs to be a

Sustained.

(By Mr. Godfrey)

When you opened the

bottle did you smell anything?
A

Yes, I did.
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1

BY MR. ZAGER:

2

Q

How long have you been a police officer?

3

A

About eleven years.

4

Q

Have you ever heard of a hand off arrest?

5

A

Excuse me.

6

Q

A hand off arrest?

7

A

8

Q

9

A

10

Q

No.
Familiar with that term?
No.
Wouldn't you have been able to arrest Heidi

11

Rock and then when another officer came on the scene

12

deliver the suspect to that officer.

13

A

Yes, I could have.

14

Q

But you didn't do that on this occasion?

15

A

16

Q

17

No.
Have you received training in making DUI

arrests?

18

A

19

Q

Where have you received that training?

20

A

Post academy.

2i

Q

Were you taught how to give field tests to

22

your suspects?

23

A

24

Q

25

Yes.

Yes.

And you were t a u g h t how t o a s s e s s t h e

subject's performance on those tests?
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
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1

decided that I was going to arrest her with the

2

information I had*

3

Q

Maybe I could elicit some help from the

4

court.

I'm having a problem understanding whether the

5

officer following the performance of the two tests

6

believed that he could arrest her or not.

7

a straightforward question.

8
9

THE COURT:

I think that's

My understanding is he didn't

believe he had enough probable cause after two field tests

10

for an arrest.

11

tests.

12

Q

His usual practice is to give four or five

Okay.

Now, you were trained to give more

13

tests to Heidi Rock and yo.u could —

14

to perform any further tests for you?

and she didn't refuse

15

A

Correct.

16

Q

And so after the two tests you could have

17

easily asked her to perform a third and a fourth and a

18

fifth test and made your determination without delay as to

19

whether or not she was under the influence of alcohol, now

20

is that correct?

21

A

I could have, but I didn't want to.

22

Q

We'll get to whether you wanted to or not

23

but you had the skill and the ability and the training to

24

do that?

25

A

That's

correct.
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1

Q

The only reason that you needed to call in

2

a second officer was to reduce the overtime pay to your

3

department?

4

A

True,

5

Q

And she was detained for that period of

6

time where she basically —

you and she waited for another

7

officer to arrive at the scene?

8

A

True.

9

Q

And during that time there was no

10

investigation that took place, there was no further field

Xi

tests while you waited for Officer Isaacson?

12

A

No, there were no more.

13

Q

Now, was Heidi Rock free to leave while you

14

were waiting for Officer Isaacson to arrive?

15

A

No, she was not.

15

Q

Now did you stick around and watch Heidi

17

Rock perform the field tests for Officer Isaacson?

18

A

Yes, I did.

19

Q

And I believe your testimony was that some

20

of the tests that you had her perform he repeated?

21

A

I don't recall.

22

Q

Well, didn't you do a gaze nystagmus test?

23

A

Yes, I did.

24

Q

Didn't Officer Isaacson have her do a gaze

25

nystagmus

test?
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1

A

No.

2

Q

Well, that's what I meant.

3

A

If I were on duty I would have had to form

4
5

If I was on duty, yes*

my opinion with only those tests which she gave me.
Q

Regardless of your opinion as to whether

5

she was intoxicated or not, you wouldn't have arrested her

7

in this situation because you were off duty?

8
9

A

If another officer was unable to respond to

my location and I was given that information, I would have

10

done the arrest myself but since one was able to come and

H

there was no need for me to incur any extra overtime then

12

I had another one come.

13

Q

And I understand it's your testimony that

14

it was about ten to fifteen minutes period of time it took

15

Officer Isaacson to arrive at the scene?

15

A

I think I said five to ten minutes.

17

Q

Okay.

18
19
20
2i
22

Five to ten minutes is now your

testimony on how long you waited.
A

As long as ten minutes.

I think that's what I said.
THE COURT:

That was his original

testimony, five to ten minutes.
MR. ZAGER:

I guess I'm referring back to

23

our discussion in the hall, but somewhere in the

24

neighborhood of ten minutes is the detention period while

25

you waited for Officer

—
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Addendum Number 10
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's
Motion to Suppress Evidence

Todd J. Godfrey #6094
Assistant City Prosecutor
Salt Lake City Corporation
451 South 200 East, #125
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY CORP.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HEIDI ROCK,
Defendant.

|
]1
I
!
1
]
]

RESPONSE TO MOTION
SUPPRESS AND MOTION
DISMISS

TO
TO

Case No. 925020755

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 19, 1992, Defendant Heidi rock was stopped by Officer
Jedd Hurst of the Salt Lake City Police Department when Officer
Hurst observed her driving her car without headlights. Officer
Hurst was off-duty, in uniform, at the time of the stop. Officer
Hurst noted a faint odor of alcohol and bloodshot eyes when he
contacted Defendant.
Due to his observations of Defendant's physical condition and
her apparent mental state, Officer Hurst asked Defendant to perform
two field sobriety tests. Based on Defendant's performance on the
tests, Officer Hurst formed the opinion that Defendant was under
the influence of alcohol.
Upon forming that opinion, Officer Hurst called for an on-duty
Officer to respond and handle what Officer Hurst believed would
ripen into an arrest for a DUI. Within five to ten minutes of the
call from Officer Hurst, Officer Rusty Isaakson of the SLCPD

responded.
Officer Isaakson requested Defendant perform field
tests so that he could make an independent assessment of
Defendant's condition. Two of the tests requested by Officer Hurst
were also requested by Officer Isaakson.
Following Defendant's performance of the tests, Officer
Isaakson arrested Defendant for DUI.
In a subsequent impound
search of the Defendant's car an open bottle of what appeared to
Officer Hurst to be vodka was found. The contents and the bottle
were destroyed.
II. ARGUMENT
A.
THE DETENTION OF HEIDI ROCK WAS PROPER AND JUSTIFIED UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATE CONSTITUTION
The procedure used by Officers Hurst and Isaakson was proper
and was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and under Article I §14 of the Utah State
Constitution.
The determination of when a detention becomes constitutionally
invalid because of excessive length focuses not on the length of
the detention alone, but on whether the police ditig^A^ly pursued
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or~dispel their
suspicions quickly, 7C}Bfi&ag^^
wafs^necessary tp detain
the defendant. United States v. Sharpe. 4q^J3_^^J^P^\^^
S. Ct.
1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); State v. Grovier. 808 P.2d 133 (Utah
App. 1991); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1990); State
v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992).
In Sharpe. the issue of an excessive detention was raised when
a defendant was detained 20 minutes by a State Highway Patrolman
who was waiting for the assistance of a DEA agent.
The Court
concluded that the 20 minute detention was not unlawful.
Considering the traditional justification for a Terry stop, the
Court noted that:
the brevity of the invasion of the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests is an important factor in determining
whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be
justifiable on reasonable suspicion,
... we have

emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement
purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time
reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685, 84 L.Ed 2d at 615.

The Court was also

careful to note that:
[t]he fact that the protection of the public might, in
the abstract have been accomplished by "less intrusive"
means
does
not, by
itself,
render
the
search
unreasonable, [citations omitted]. The question is not
simply whether some other alternative means was
available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in
failing to recognize or to pursue it.
Sharpe at 687, 84 L.Ed.2d at 616.
The situation in Sharpe is analogous to the case currently
before the court. In Sharpe, a law enforcement officer detained an
individual while waiting for another law enforcement officer who
was better situated to conduct the investigation. The matter at
hand in Sharpe was a narcotics investigation and the DEA agent was
better able to conduct a full and proper investigation, although
the State Highway Patrolman certainly had the authority and some
experience in conducting narcotics investigations.
Similarly, in this case, Officer Hurst had the skills and the
ability to conduct the investigation, but Officer Isaakson was
better situated to conduct the investigation. Department Policy
required that Officer Hurst call for an on-duty Officer to handle
the situation. Officer Isaakson responded to the scene within five
to ten minutes, less than the time of the detention in Sharpe.
Clearly, the detention in the case now before the court was no more
intrusive than the delay in Sharpe, and was occasioned by an
equally legitimate purpose. Although Officer Hurst certainly could
have conducted the investigation himself, he did not act
unreasonably in calling for an on-duty officer.
Utah case law has also followed the rule set out in Sharpe.
In State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133 (Utah App. 1991), the Court of
Appeals of Utah upheld a 90 minute detention necessitated by a
search of defendant's car.
In Grovier, the Court noted
specifically that the focus was not on the length of the detention,
but on the means used by the officers to dispel their suspicions.

Grovier at 136.
The length of the detention in Grovier was apparently
justified by the officer's concern for safety.
Although the
justification for the length of the detention was different from
the justification presented by Officer Hurst in the present case,
the reason are subject to the same reasonableness standard.
Grovier distinctly noted that no major interruptions occurred
during the search. Under the same reasonableness standard, it is
difficult to imagine that ten to fifteen minutes is a major
interruption that would invalidate a proper investigation.
B.
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE OPEN CONTAINER AND ITS CONTENTS DOES
REQUIRE DISMISSAL OF THE CHARGE
Defendant's challenge to the City's destruction of the open
container and its contents is based on the Constitutions of the
Untied States and the State of Utah and as such is governed by a
reasonableness standard.
The fact that the tangible evidence does not remain is a
matter that would properly go to the weight of the evidence
presented at the time of trial, not to its admissibility. Officer
Hurst, as he testified at the time of the hearing on the issue, is
able to provide proper foundation for what his testimony will be as
to the contents of the container seized from the Defendant.
Defendant also has the opportunity to present evidence to the
contrary. The City acknowledges that it is a proper topic of
examination of witnesses as to why the evidence was not retained.
III. SUMMARY
Under either the United States Constitution or the
Constitution of the State of Utah, Officer Hurst's actions are
reasonable and justified and the detention of the Defendant Heidi
Rock was proper.
Additionally the destruction of the open container does not
rise to the level of a violation of Due Process and does not

require suppression of evidence or dismissal of the charge.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons the City respectfully requests
that the Court deny the motion of Defendant.
Dated this 29th day of March, 1992.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct
copy of the above memorandum to defense counsel Mitch Zagar 3587
West 4700 South Salt Lake City, Utah 84118
this 29th day of March, 1993.

Addendum Number 11
Defendant's Motion to Suppress
Evidence in a DUI Charge

MITCHEL ZAGER - 3968
Attorney for Defendant
3587 West 4700 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118
Telephone: 801-964-6100
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

|
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE IN D.U.I. CHARGE AND
DISMISS OPEN CONTAINER CHARGE

Plaintiff,

|

v.

i

HEIDI ROCK,

i

Case No. 925020755 TC

j

Honorable Philip K. Palmer

Defendant.
I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. HEIDI ROCK was detained by Officer Hurst between 5 and 10 minutes during which
time she was required to wait for Officer Isaacson to arrive at the scene and conduct field tests,
which included some of the field tests previously conducted by Officer Hurst.
2. Officer Hurst had the same skills, training and qualifications as Officer Isaacson
concerning DUI investigations and conducting field tests.
3. Officer Hurst had observed the diiving pattern and demeanor of Heidi Rock as she
exited her vehicle. Officer Isaacson possessed no personal knowledge of those facts.
4. Officer Hurst testified that the prolonged detention was necessitated by his off-duty
status.

II.
THE PROLONGED DETENTION OF HEIDI ROCK BY OFFICER
HURST VIOLATES BOTH THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTIONS AND WAS WITHOUT LEGITIMATE
REASON AND THEREFORE UNREASONABLE
Nowhere in case history has a Court held a detention permissible for the reason that an
officer was off-duty. There are cases where Courts have held that a detention was permissible
when legitimate reasons were shown. In United States vs. Sharpe. the Court found legitimate
reasons to find the detention permissible where a patrolman detained a suspect until a DEA
Agent with superior training and experience in dealing with narcotics investigations arrived at
the scene. United States vs. Sharpe. 470 U.S. 675, 105, S.Ct. 1568, 1576 (1985). In Sharpe
the patrolman who made the stop lacked the training and experience in dealing with narcotics
and did not know all the facts involved in the case which were known to the DEA Agent from
his previous observations. Id. at 1576. As further justification fc\ the detention in Sharpe the
Court recognized that the delay in the investigation was created by the defendant's own evasive
actions in avoiding the police. IdL

In determining whether a detention is permissible, the

United States Supreme Court in Sharpe stated that:
. . . whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as
an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine
whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that
was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during
which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. IcL at 1575
(emphasis added).
The Sharpe Court pointed out that "the question is not simply whether some other
alternative was available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or
to pursue it." IcL at 1576.
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In this instance the detention is impermissible, since Officer Hurst has testified that he
possessed training and experience in dealing with DUI arrests equivalent to that of Officer
Isaacson. Furthermore, Officer Hurst was better situated that Officer Isaacson to conduct the
DUI investigation, having personally observed the driving pattern of Heidi Rock and her
demeanor as she exited her vehicle. It was Officer Hurst in this case who possessed all the facts
involved in the case, not Officer Isaacson. The legitimate reasons supporting the permissible
detention in Sharpe are not present in this case.
Legitimate reasons for a prolonged detention were also found in State vs. Grovier where
a vehicle search occurred during a 90-minute period without major interruption and where the
delay was necessitated to ensure the officers' safety. State vs. Grovier. 808 P.2d. 133 (Utah
App. 1991). In our case there was no reason nor necessity to seek an alternative investigation
procedure. There was only one course of action that was reasonable and that was for Officer
Hurst to complete his investigation without delay by conducting a sufficient number of field tests
to determine Heidi Rock's sobriety. Incidently, a hand-off arrest could have been made to
Officer Isaacson in the event Heidi Rock was eventually arrested, thereby satisfying Officer
Hurst's concern regarding his off-duty status.
The Court in Grovier states that:
. . . the detention must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Grovier at 136
(emphasis added).
In this case the prolonged detention was not necessary to determine whether Heidi Rock
was under the influence of alcohol. Officer Hurst had the skills to complete the investigation
and make the determination without delay. The fact that Officer Hurst was off duty is not a

3

legitimate reason recognized by any Court to detain an individual's freedom. Officer Hurst's
failure to complete his investigation without delay is unreasonable, unnecessary and
impermissible. Absent a legitimate reason, Heidi Rock's fundamental rights as guaranteed by
the Utah and United States Constitutions were violated and require suppression of evidence
following the unlawful detention.
III.
THE DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE BY SALT LAKE CITY POLICE
OFFICERS REQUIRE DISMISSAL OF THE OPEN CONTAINER CHARGE
In this instance Salt Lake City Police Officers destroyed material, tangible evidence
which they allege was an open container of alcohol.

Heidi Rock is denied her due process

under the United States and Utah Constitutions and is deprived of an opportunity to effectively
cross-examine and confront the allegations against her due to the destruction of material evidence
as described. Her opportunity to test and otherwise examine the alleged evidence is gone as a
result of the Officers' actions.
Admission of the officers' testimony that the label on the bottle said vodka is hearsay and
also violates the Best Evidence Rule. For the reasons stated, the charge of Open Container
requires dismissal.
IV.
CONCLUSION

The unreasonable, unjustified and unnecessary detention of Heidi Rock violates her
fundamental freedoms as guaranteed under the United States and Utah Constitutions as stated.
The reason given that Officer Hurst was off-duty is not a legitimate reason, nor has it been
recognized as such in any case cited as a justification to violating a person's fundamental rights.
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This instance is plainly distinguishable from the legitimate reasons for extended detentions
upheld in each of the cases cited before this Court.
Furthermore, the destruction of material evidence requires dismissal of the Open
Container Charge.
Officer Hurst's arbitrary and unreasonable actions in detaining Heidi Rock without
legitimate reason requires suppression of all the evidence obtained after the unlawful detention.
Based upon the pleadings, testimony and oral argument, defendant moves this Honorable Court
to grant this Motion for Suppression and Dismissal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^_

day of April, 1993.

Mitchel Zager
/
J
Attorney for Deftryfany
MAILING CERTIFICATE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing Motion To Suppress Evidence and
Dismiss Open Container Charge was sent via U.S. mail, postage pre-paid, this 6th day of April,
1993, to Salt Lake City Prosecutor, 451 South 200 East, Room 125, Salt Lake City, UT 84111.
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Addendum Number 12
Third Judicial Court's Reaffirmation
Decision of 4/16/93

Cftrtr Circuit Court
Judge Philip K. Palmer

April 16, 1993

Mr. Mitchell Zager
Attorney at Law
3587 West 4 7 0 0 South
Salt Lake City UT 84118
RE: Salt Lake City vs. Heidi Rock
Dear Mr. Zager:
For your information, no copy of your responsive brief is in the court file, nor
can my clerk locate one anywhere in the court system. Todd Godfrey, of the
Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office, provided me with a copy of the brief he
received, at your request.
I have carefully read your brief but regret to inform you that it does not
change my original decision. Todd informs me you will be out of t o w n
approximately 30 days, but will be back prior to the May 19th date set for a jury
trial on this matter. The court will hold this day open pending your return to
Salt Lake City.
Please notify the court if you do not intend to pursue a jury triaJ on the
above date.

Philip K. Palmer
Jhird Circuit Court Judge
PKP/ab

451 South 200 East / Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 / 801-533-3971

Addendum Number 13
Transcript of Hearing on 6/17/93,
pages 2, 3 and 4

P R O C E E D I N G S

1
2

THE COURT:

This is your matter.

3

MR. ZAGER:

Yes, Judge.

4

THE COURT:

Oh, yes.

Heidi Rock.

Heidi Rock.

That

5 matter is on for review, I think.
6

MR. ZAGER:

Come on up, Heidi.

7

THE COURT:

This will be a plea, is that

8

right, Mr. Zager?

9

MR. ZAGER:

Yes, Your Honor.

10

THE COURT:

All right.

11

MR. ZAGER:

There's a caveat on the pleading.

12 We are considering an appeal in the case concerning the
13

motion that we brought and in view of that I imagine the

14

severity of the sentence may affect that decision.
THE COURT:

15
16
17

it?

Okay.

Your time hasn't run has

Okay, what's the proposed plea?
MR. GODFREY:

Your Honor, we're moving to

18

dismiss the infractions charged against Ms. Rock.

I believe

19

she's going to enter a change of plea on the DUI.

It is our

20

understanding that is a

21

presentence recommendations for the court also.

22
23

plea.

THE COURT:

I have some

So you're moving to dismiss

Counts Two and Three.

24

MR. GODFREY:

25

THE COURT:

That's correct.

Did you go over a plea form with
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1 Ms. Rock, Mr. Zager.
2

MR. ZAGER:

I haven't, Your Honor.

3

THE COURT:

Will you give him the plea form?

4

THE CLERK:

(unclear)

I passed a couple out

5 this morning already.
6

MR. GODFREY:

7

THE CLERK:

8

MR. GODFREY:

9
10
11
12
13

You handed them to me.

Did I hand it to you?
You handed it to me not to Mr.

Zager.
THE CLERK:

I apologize, Your Honor, I can't

tell these two guys apart.
THE COURT:

All right, Ms. Rock.

Do you understand that by pleading guilty to the

14

DUI you give up your right to a trial on the charge and you

15

give up your right not to incriminate yourself because by

16

pleading guilty you do admit that on July 19th of last year

17

you drove your vehicle in Salt Lake City while you were

18

under the influence of alcohol or had a blood alcohol

19

content of .08 grams or greater.

20

the admission you are making.

21

MS. ROCK:

22

THE COURT:

Do you understand that's

Yes.
You also give up your right to

23

appeal after trial, do you understand and wish to waive all

24

those rights, Ms. Rock.

25

MR. ZAGER:

With the one caveat, Your Honor,
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1 on the appellant issues that have been specifically reserved
2 in this case.
THE COURT:

3

All right.

You understand all

4 the other information in that plea form that Mr. Zager has
5 gone over with you?
6

MS. ROCK:

Yes, I do.

7

THE COURT:

Go ahead and sign it if you would

8 both, please.
Ms. Rock, what is your plea to the charge of

9

10 driving while under the influence of alcohol?
11

MS. ROCK:

12

THE COURT:

13

Guilty.
The court will accept the plea.

Do you waive time for sentencing, Mr. Zager?

14

MR. ZAGER:

We do, Your Honor.

15

THE COURT:

What was the City's

16

recommendation?
MR. GODFREY:

17

Your Honor, it's a rare

18

circumstance when I ever have the opportunity to speak on

19

behalf of the defendant but I have spoken with Mr. Zager

20

twice about Ms. Rock.

21

situation where the breath test was in what I would call the

22 medium range.
23

This is a first offense.

It is a

I don't think there's an alcohol problem that

underlies this offense.

I'm convinced from my discussions

24 with Mr. Zager that she's taken a lot of steps to see that
25

this doesn't happen again.

I don't think it's a situation
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State v. Davis.
821 P.2d, 9, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)

STATE v. DAVIS

Utah

9
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CONCLUSION
.We vacate the Commission's order denyag*Adams benefits and direct the Commisioh'to produce adequate findings of fact
hd conclusions of law and enter a new
rder.
GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ., concur.

(O

|K£YNUM8ERSYSTEM>

5TATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Edwin Leslie DAVIS, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 910166-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 5, 1991.
Defendant was convicted in the Fifth
Jircuit Court, St. George Department,
bines' L. Shumate, J., of driving under the
Dfluence, interfering with peace officer,
fusing to provide information, and drivDgj^vith' revoked license. Defendant ap^ d 7 i j T h e Court of Appeals, Bench, P.J.,
Jlf&J^t. officer had reasonable suspicion
o^etain defendant.
•^Affirmed.
^grhninal Law <s=>1130(5)
~ ^igviewing defendant's driving under
pSfisence conviction, Court of Appeals
(JiJiJiot consider defendant's challenge
|grial court's finding that particular road
""" Pe& to public where defendant did not
J l ^ u e 1 in compliance with Rules of
?jl!¥$~ Procedure. Rules App.Proc,
||Wminai Law <s=>1158(4)
^ c ° u r t ' s factual findings underly^Jsion^to grant or deny motion to
qgateJfindings.

Her remaining claims are

suppress will not be disturbed unless
"clearly erroneous," that is, against clear
weight of evidence or such that appellate
court reaches definite and firm conviction
that mistake has been made.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

3. Arrest <®=>63.5(1)
Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures applies
to all detentions, including brief investigatory stops by police that fall short of formal arrest. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
4. Arrest <3=»68(4)
No Fourth Amendment seizure occurs
if nothing during encounter between police
officer and citizen approximates detention.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
5. Arrest <s=>63.5(4)
Where police officer approaches person
and asks questions, person's refusal to talk
to officer, without more, does not furnish
reasonable grounds for further detention.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
6. Arrest <s=>68(4)
Person is "seized" within meaning of
Fourth Amendment when officer deprives
person of liberty by means of physical
force or show of authority. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. '4.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

7. Arrest <3=>63.5(4)
There must be reasonable basis for
even brief investigatory detention and officers must have reasonable suspicion, based
on objective facts, that individual is involved in criminal activity. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 4.
8. Arrest <s=*68(4)
Whether objective facts known to officer support reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing to justify investigative detention is to
be determined by totality of circumstances
and in light of officer's experience and
training. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
best left for another day.
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9. Arrest «=€3^,j.
fore the car reached the officer, it turned
Investigates S K * - - .
_.
porary and last v ,,^^
^ tem " down a side road leading to some nearby
to effect purpos, .> ^
^ " ^ " a r corrals, a small subdivision, and the private
J
Amend. 4.
- -~ - i 0-OESt residence of the developer of the subdivision. The car traveled about 100 feet on
10. Arrest «=^^ s
the side road when its lights suddenly exThere was L' -^^_
tinguished.
Fourth Amends^ ^ T T ^ J * 3 0 5 »
I a i of5
The officer was concerned about the poscer pulled his car - ^ V " " ^ ' '
already parkec ^ ^
f o n t ' s sibility of car problems and went to assist.
Amend. 4.
—*-*- Const As the officer pulled in behind the stopped
car, he noticed a can of beer sitting on the
11. Automobiles <==%&•>
trunk. The officer also noticed an opened
Officer had r ^ - ^ __ .
passenger door, and a man standing near
crime had beer r . ^ J ^ ^ the trunk, urinating. The officer suspected
justify detention ; c ' ^ ' S t S ^ C f i r r t *-° an alcohol-related violation and activated
pulling his car ~ ^
" ^ * : e c zx>
the overhead lights on his vehicle.
which was parb
The officer then approached the car and
b e e r c a n o n t r u ^ ^ T - ^ d^o o^r
and man standi^ v^LJ****?
' found Davis seated behind the steering
i_ _
~ _ _ - --««£ s r aa; srinat- wheel. Although the keys were still in the
ing
U.S.C.A.'
ignition, the engine was off. The officer
U.C.A.1953, 41-6~44iS ~_--_?2
asked Davis where he had been and requested Davis to produce a driver's license
or some other form of identification.
J- MacArthur W--~- defendant and ajr^L
"
" ^ for Davis said he was returning from closing
"the Eagles" in Hurricane, but refused to
Eric A. Ludlow a^ *-__ , _
produce
any identification. During this
St. George, for p ] ^ *T/~ ' ' t ^ * ? '
verbal exchange, the officer smelled a
strong odor of alcohol on Davis's breath.
Before BENCH. C-2£E*T™n .,
ORME, JJ.
- « ^ O O D aid
The man who had been urinating returned to the car and handed the officer
the vehicle registration through the drivBENCH, Presiding J . ^ ^
er's open door. The officer repeated his
Edwin Lesh'e Darc Vao „
driving under the -^-S. ~^T"
^ request for Davis's license. This time,
with a peace office- ^ T ^ * * however, Davis cursed the officer,
information; and, d r ^ T ^ J ; r 0 v i d e slammed the car door, and drove off withlicense. Followingfcs3 n T % * ~ Y ° k e d out producing any identification. The offia
sion motion by the -~i
^^P1"68- cer pursued Davis to a motor home near
tered a conditional g ^ p ^ ? ? en" the developer's residence. Davis was subpeal followed. We S r i
** sequently arrested for driving under the
influence, interference with an arresting
officer, refusal to provide information, and
I- FACTS
driving with a revoked license.
On December 16. l%o ^ , Jr
[1] At the suppression hearing, Davis
officer of the Hurries Q £ - * £ ¥ " " ^
ment was parked in , t 2 T ^ ^ denied that he had driven on the state road,
its headlights off, to Z t ^ T "
** but claimed that he had driven along a
f
cu e
parallel road, and stopped the car to move
on a state road in W a ^ J ^ r ° " "
ln
a rock. Since the place of the initial enthe rear view mirror, %%£?£"*•
31
counter
was private, Davis argued that any
car with its h e a d h g h t s - o n h i ^ ^
police investigation was precluded.1 Davis

1. On appeal, Davis chaBena* tr *n dJi n g
trial court that the road ^ $H
^ *«
^ ° P » to the public

Although Davis lists the issue as one presented
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[3,4] At the outset, we reiterate the
well-settled law since Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968),
that the Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures
applies to all detentions, including brief
investigatory stops by police that fall short
of formal arrest. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 88
S.Ct. at 1879. See also State v. Sierra, 754
P.2d 972, 975 (Utah App.1988); State v.
Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App.1987).
Not every encounter between the police
and the citizenry, however, implicates a
Fourth Amendment violation; if nothing
during an encounter approximates a detention, there is no Fourth Amendment seizure. United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d
497 (1980).
[5] In Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 87-88, this
court held that a person is not seized when
a police officer merely approaches the perFollowing the denial of the suppression son on the street and asks questions, if the
motion, Davis entered a conditional guilty person stopped is willing to listen. The
plea and this appeal followed. See gener- person approached is not required to listen
ally State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah to or answer an officer's questions, and
App.1988) (regarding the use of conditional refusal to talk to an officer, without more,
guilty pleas).
"does not furnish reasonable grounds for
further detention." Id. at 88. See also
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103
S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983).
m [2] Search and seizure challenges are
r
fact* sensitive. State v. Smith, 781 P.2d
[6-8] However, a person is "seized"
r
Ji79,"880 (Utah 1989). The factual findings within the meaning of the Fourth Amendr
ofja trial court that underlie its decision to ment, when an officer deprives a person of
•^grant or deny a motion to suppress will not his liberty by means of physical force or
sbe disturbed on appeal unless clearly erro- show of authority. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21,
neous. Smith, 781 P.2d at 881. Factual 88 S.Ct. at 1879 n. 16; Trujillo, 739 P.2d at
rfindings are clearly erroneous if they are 87. Since the Fourth Amendment protects
* ,against the clear weight of evidence, or against unreasonable searches and seiJ_the appellate court otherwise reaches a def- zures, there must be a reasonable basis for
*u! cn(* ^rm conv^ction that a mistake has even a brief investigatory detention and
Vmade." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d officers must have a "reasonable suspicion,
[91,5193 (Utah 1987).
based on objective facts, that the individual
is involved in criminal activity." Brovm v.
III. ANALYSIS
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641,
IP|vis_ argues that the police encounter 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). Whether the objec;
illegal because the officer did not have tive facts known to the officer support a
gffobable cause to detain, question, and ar- reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing is to be
i p | s f o r "driving under the influence and determined by the totality of the circum^ | f £ ^ e r offenses that arose out of the stances and in light of the officer's experience and training. State v. Dorsey, 731
|fention and arrest."
also argued that the arrest was invalid
because it was not based on probable
cause.
The trial court held that the officer had a
sufficiently articulable suspicion of wrongdoing, on the basis of the facts as the
officer perceived them, to permit investigation.. The court analyzed the encounter by
noting that the officer was first alerted to
a possible problem by seeing a vehicle turn
off the State road and suddenly stop. The
court then pointed out that, as the officer
'arrived at the scene, he saw a can of beer
"and a man urinating in close proximity to
the car he had seen on the road only moments before. The trial court found that
these facts, "by reason of simple biology,"
gave the officer an articulable suspicion
'that an alcohol-related offense had been
committed and, on that basis, that an investigation was proper.

.T fal we do not consider it for failure to
our briefing requirements under
~ -*24(aj"of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

See Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 72 (Utah
App.1991); Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal,
746 P.2d 1182, 1184-85 (Utah App.1987).
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P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986); State v.
Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App.1990);
State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 508-09
(Utah App.1989).
[9] Moreover, an investigatory detention must be "temporary and last no longer
than is necessary to effect the purpose of
the stop." State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616,
617 (Utah 1987) (citing United States v.
Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.1984),
cert denied, 476 U.S. 1142, 106 S.Ct. 2250,
90 L.Ed.2d 696 (1986)).
[10] In this case, there was no detention subject to Fourth Amendment protection when the police officer initially pulled
in behind the stopped car. Nothing m the
record suggests that the officer caused
Davis to stop the car or that formal investigation into possible criminal wrongdoing
had begun when the officer first arrived.
The car in which Davis was seated had
stopped before the officer arrived, independent of any action taken by the officer,
express or implied, under show of authority
or physical force.2 Davis had not been
detained by the officer, even momentarily,
and could have reasonably believed that he
was free to drive away as the officer pulled
up in his vehicle. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at
554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877.
[11] Hpwever, the moment the officer
saw a can of beer on the trunk of the car,
an open passenger door, and a man urinating, the officer had a reasonable suspicion,
based upon objective facts, that a crime
had been committed. The officer then detained Davis by a display of authority when
he activated the overhead lights on his
vehicle. Although there may be a host of
other innocent explanations to account for
the presence of the persons and the things
in and around the car, the officer had a
reasonable basis to believe that the man
urinating had been a passenger in the car,
and that he had been drinking during the
time he had been a passenger.
The officer had a reasonable suspicion,
based on objective facts, of a violation of
the open container law, since it is illegal for
2. Davis cites several cases for the proposition
that a police officer must have reasonable suspicion to detain for a traffic violation. See State

a passenger to drink any alcoholic beverage in a motor vehicle, whether or not the
vehicle is moving, stopped or parked on a
highway. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-644.20 (1990). In addition, the officer had a
reasonable basis to suspect the driver of a
related violation since it is illegal to allow
another to keep, carry, possess or transport
an open container of alcohol in the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle when
the vehicle is on the highway. Id.
A peace officer has statutory authority
to "stop any person in a public place when
[the officer] has reasonable suspicion to
believe [the person] has committed or is m
the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand
his name, address and an explanation of his
actions." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15
(1990). Therefore, the officer could properly approach Davis, and ask for proof of
identification as part of his investigation.
Based on objective facts learned in the
course of his investigation, the officer had
reasonable grounds to suspect Davis of
drunk driving. The officer observed a can
of beer on the car, smelled a strong odor of
alcohol on Davis's breath, and found him to
be uncooperative and argumentative.
Davis's refusal to produce a driver's license
also provided grounds to suspect Davis of a
license-related violation.
The factual findings of the trial court
that the officer had probable cause were,
therefore, not clearly erroneous. They
were not against the clear weight of evidence, and we are not convinced that a
mistake was made.
The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed.
GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ., concur.

Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986). Since the
police encounter in this case was not initiated
by a traffic stop for a moving violation, Davis's
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uously barred the present action against
Davis.
We look to contract law to answer appellant's assertion. We first must determine
whether the release provisions relating to
appellant's claims against Davis are ambiguous. "Whether an ambiguity exists in a
contract is a question of law which we
review for correctness." Jarman v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, 794 P.2d 492,
494 (Utah
Ct.App.1990).
Moreover,
"[qjuestions of whether a contract is ambiguous because of uncertain meaning of
terms, missing terms, or facial deficiencies
are questions of law that must be determined by the court before parol or extrinsic
evidence may be admitted to clarify the
contractual intent of the parties." Fitzgerald v. Corbett, 793 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah
1990). See also Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a).

agree to pursue recovery directly from
Davis and not from the released parties
under the doctrine of respondeat superior,
she easily could have stated that in the
release. This court cannot rewrite the contract because appellant failed to include
language to protect her rights. As stated
by Professor Corbin, "it certainly is not
proper to reform the contract or to put in
new provisions merely because one of the
parties is disappointed in the . . . outcome."
3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 541
(1972). The Utah Supreme Court has echoed Professor Corbin's statement, noting
that "[a] court will not . . . make a better
contract for the parties than they have
made for themselves," adding that u[a]n
express agreement or covenant relating to
a specific contract right excludes the possibility of an implied covenant of a different
or contradictory nature." Rio Algom
Corp. v. Jimco, Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505
(Utah 1980), at 505 (citation omitted). The
release, by its clear and unambiguous language, releases Davis from liability for his
actions taken while he was an employee.

"[T]he settled rule [for] interpreting a
contract [is to] first look to the four corners of the agreement to determine the
intentions of the parties. The use of extrinsic evidence is permitted only if the
document appears to incompletely express
the parties' agreement or if it is ambiguous
in expressing that agreement." Ron Case
CONCLUSION
Roofing, 773 P.2d at 1385 (citations omitted); see also John Call Eng'g v. Manti
Davis' status as an employee was undisCity Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah puted on summary judgment. Because
1987); Nixon and Nixon, Inc. v. John New Davis was an employee of the settling par& Assoc., 641 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1982). ties, the release, in clear and unambiguous
"Contract provisions are not rendered am- language, bars appellant's claims against
biguous merely by the fact that the parties him. We therefore affirm the trial court's
urge diverse interpretations." Jones v. summary judgment dismissing appellant's
Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980).
claims against Davis.
Appellant claims the meaning of the passage in the release which reserves her
GARFF and RUSSON, JJ., concur.
rights against Davis is ambiguous. Because of this alleged ambiguity, appellant
urges this court to consider extrinsic evidence (the parties' unexpressed intentions)
and interpret this passage to mean that
| K I Y N U M B I * SYSTIM>
appellant merely agreed to pursue recovery
directly from Davis and not from the released parties under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The trial court did not look to extrinsic
evidence but concluded the unambiguous
language of the release barred appellant's
claim. We agree. If appellant intended to
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
David Vance GROVIER and Petie Ray
Hale, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 900329-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 7, 1991.

Defendant was convicted of possession
of a controlled substance. Judgment was
entered in the Fifth District Court, Iron
County, J. Philip Eves, J. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J.,
held that: (1) trial court's determination
that initial stop of vehicle was made on
reasonable and articulable suspicion that
crime had been committed, based upon report of confidential informant, was not
clearly erroneous; (2) defendant had voluntarily consented to search of vehicle; and
(3) officer's act of pushing aside heater
hose, which revealed presence of drug, had
not exceeded scope of consent which had
prohibited dismantling of the vehicle.
Affirmed.

1. Arrest ®=»63.5(6)
A reasonable and articulable suspicion,
sufficient to support an initial stop of an
automobile without a warrant or probable
cause, may be premised upon an informant's tip so long as it is sufficiently reliable. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
2. Arrest ®=>63.5(6)
Trial court determination that police
had reasonable and articulable suspicion
that crime was committed when stopping
automobile was not clearly erroneous; confidential informant known to officer, who
had previously tipped him approximately 10
to 15 times, had reported presence of methamphetamine in a described automobile
bearing specified license plate, and informant gave approximate area where vehicle
was seen. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.

3. Arrest <S=>63.5(9)
Determination of whether a detention
of automobile, initially stopped for valid
reasonable and articulable suspicion that
crime had been committed, was constitutionally invalid because excessive in length,
focuses not on length of detention alone
but on whether police diligently pursued
means of investigation that was likely to
confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
4. Arrest 0=63.5(9)
Duration of stop of vehicle, involving
search for the presence of drugs, did not
exceed the minimum intrusion necessary to
dispel suspicion; automobile had promptly
been taken to a sally port to continue the
search, which was conducted without major
interruptions and lasted no longer than 90
minutes.
5. Searches and Seizures <s=»194, 198
In order for a consent to search of
automobile to be constitutionally valid
there must: (1) be clear and positive testimony that consent was unequivocal and
specific and freely and intelligently given;
(2) government must prove consent was
given without duress or coercion, express
or implied; and (3) courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver of
functional constitutional rights and there
must be convincing evidence that such
rights were waived.
U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 4.
6. Searches and Seizures <®=3184
Consent to drug search of automobile,
made while detainee was not under restraint, was voluntary even though he was
later handcuffed and placed in a holding
area. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
7. Searches and Seizures <&=>186
Statement made by detainee whose vehicle was being searched for drugs, that he
did not want his car dismantled, did not
constitute revocation of his earlier consent
to a search of his vehicle, including the
trunk and motor compartment. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
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8. Searches and Seizures <s=>186
Police officer's pushing aside of an officers, Sergeant Dennis Anderson, stop
automobile heater hose, in connection with the green Riviera as it approached the Iron
a search of detained vehicle for the pres- County Correctional Facility between 11:15
ence of drugs, did not exceed scope of and 11:30 a.m. Sergeant Anderson, not
detainee's consent to search, which had having been told by Hansen why the car
prohibited dismantling of vehicle; heater should be stopped, told defendant that "a
hose was undamped when search began citizen had possibly seen him smoking marand it became disconnected when officer ijuana," to which defendant replied, "I_
pushed it aside to look up under dash. don't have anything, go ahead and search."
Anderson then askedT"can wal'J and defenU.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
dant replied, "yes." Sergeant Anderson^
informed defendant that additional officers
Loni F. DeLand (argued), McRae & De- were on the way to help and^ defendant
Land, Salt Lake City, for defendants and stated, "go ahead and search."
appellants.
Shortly after Anderson stopped defenR. Paul Van Dam, State Atty. Gen., Marian Decker (argued), Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
Before BENCH, JACKSON and
RUSSON, JJ.
OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
Defendant appeals from an order denying his motion to suppress evidence. The
defendant, David Vance Grovier, was
charged with possession of a controlled
substance (24.8 grams of methamphetamine) in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8 (Supp.1990). Defendant challenges the order on three grounds: (1) the
officer did not have reasonable suspicion to
stop him, (2) defendant's consent to search
his vehicle was not voluntary, and (3) the
search of his vehicle exceeded the scope of
his consent. We affirm.
FACTS
On February 23, 1990, at approximately
10:30 a.m., Agent Lynn Davis of the Cedar
City Police Department received a message
to call one of his confidential informants.
The informant gave the license plate number of a green 1973 Buick Riviera as either
175BAT or 175BAP and told Davis that
there was methamphetamine in the car.
Officer Davis relayed this information to
the Chief of Police, Peter J. Hansen, who
then located the vehicle and had one of his

dant, Hansen and Officer jKejyirLJlrton arrivea\__prtoif searched defendant's passenger, Petie Ray Hale, and removed a "fannypack" which was searched by Hansen.
Inside the fannypack, Hansen found a marijuana pipe and other drug paraphernalia.
Subsequently, the trial court gran teiL
Hale's motion to jsuppress this evjdejice on
the grounds that it was obtained without a
warrant and that no exception to a warrantless search existed.
While Hale was being arrested, Hansen
informed defendant that he intended to
search the car for drugs. Defendant replied, "go ahead and look." Hansen then
asked him if his consent included the
"trunk, passenger area, and motor compartment," to which defendant replied,
"yes." Several officers searched the vehicle for approximately twenty minutes
during which time no controlled substances
were found.

Hansen approached defendant a second
time, telling him that he believed that there
were drugs in the car, and asked defendant
if he intended to tell Hansen where to find
them. Hansen further told defendant that
he intended "to remove the car from the
street into the sally port of the correctional
facility and dismantle the car bolt by bolt if
necessary." Defendant replied, "go for it."
Defendant was then handcuffed, and he,
Hale, and the vehicle were transported to
the correctional facility which was approximately 200 yards from the initial stop. Defendant, while riding in the back of
Anderson's patrol car on the way to the
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correctional facility, stated that he did not
want his car "torn apart."
Once at the facility, defendant, who was
not formally charged at the time, was
placed in a holding area between the sally
port and the booking area while the search
proceeded. While there, defendant told
Hansen he did not have permission to dismantle the car. Hansen then instructed
the officers conducting the search not to
dismantle the car. Upon arriving at the
correctional facility Gary Bulloch, a corrections officer, searched defendant. While
being searched, defendant stated that he
did not want his car torn apart.
After an unsuccessful cursory search,
Hansen left the sally port to obtain a
search warrant to dismantle the car.
While Hansen was seeking to obtain a
search warrant, Davis continued the
search. When Davis pushed an undamped
heater hose aside to reach up under the
dash, the heater hose end fell away, revealing a cloth wrapped around a ziplock bag
containing 24.8 grams of methamphetamine.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review findings of fact underlying a
trial court's decision on a motion to suppress under the "clearly erroneous" standard. State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882
(Utah Ct.App. 1990); State v. Webb, 790
P.2d 65, 82 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v.
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah CtApp.
1988). A trial court's findings of fact are
clearly erroneous only if they are against
the clear weight of the evidence. Marshall, 791 P.2d at 882.
THE INITIAL STOP
Defendant
claims
that
Sergeant
Anderson did not have sufficient reasonable suspicion to make the initial stop.
This court has noted that there are three
constitutionally permissible levels of police
stops:
(1) [A]n officer may approach a citizen at
anytime and pose questions so long as
the citizen is not detained against his
will; (2) an officer may seize a person if

the officer has an "articulable suspicion"
that defendant has committed or is about
to commit a crime; however, the detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop; (3) an officer may
arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been
committed.
State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah
1991) (quoting State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d
616, 617-618 (Utah 1987) (per curiam)).
We have previously held that a level two
stop requires a "reasonable articulable suspicion" that defendant has committed or is
about to commit a crime. State v. Menke,
787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah Ct.App.1990); see
also, Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (Supp.
1990). Moreover, a reasonable articulable
suspicion must be based on " 'objective
facts' that the 'individual is involved in
criminal activity.'" State v. Holmes, 774
P.2d 506, 508 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) (quoting
State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah
1985)). "Whether there are objective facts
to justify such a stop depends on the 'totality of the circumstances.'" Id. (quoting
State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah
1987)).
[1,2] A reasonable suspicion may be
premised upon an informant's tip so long
as it is sufficiently reliable. Alabama v.
White, — U.S.
, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2414,
110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990); Adams
v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47, 92 S.Ct.
1921, 1923-24, 32 L.Ed 2d 612 (1972); United States v. Thompson, 906 F.2d 1292,
1295 (8th Cir.1990). In the case at bar, the
trial court made the following findings: the
informant was known to Officer Davis; he
had previously tipped Davis approximately
ten to fifteen times; he reported to Davis
that he observed methamphetamine in an
older green Buick Riviera driven by a man
with a female passenger; he identified the
license plate number as either 175BAT or
175BAP; and he last observed the vehicle
at the south end of Main Street in Cedar
City.
Based on those findings, the trial court
concluded that the police officer's stop was
"based upon articulable and substantial
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facts that would lead a reasonable and
prudent police officer to believe that a felo
ny was presently being committed
"
After examining the totality of the circum
stances, we conclude that the trial court's
determination of reasonable suspicion was
not clearly erroneous
[3,4] Defendant further claims that
even if the officer had a reasonable suspi
cion that a crime had been committed, the
officer's search exceeded the minimum intrusion necessary to dispel or confirm his
reasonable suspicion In analyzing accept
able lengths of detention, we have stated
The United States Supreme Court has
not chosen to define a bright line rule as
to the acceptable length of a detention
because "common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid
criteria " United States v Sharpe, 470
U S 675, 685, 105 S Ct 1568, 1575, 84
L Ed 2d 605 (1985) The Court has chosen to focus, not on the length of the
detention alone, but on "whether the police diligently pursued a means of investi
gation that was likely to confirm or dis
pel their suspicions quickly, during which
time it was necessary to detain the defen
d a n t " Id at 686, 105 S Ct at 1575
State v Marshall, 791 P 2d 880, 884 (Utah
CtAppl990)
Defendant claims that the search, which
lasted no longer than ninety minutes, exceeded the minimum intrusion necessary to
dispel the officer's reasonable suspicions
However, the length of defendant's detention is not the primary focus Rather, the
focus is upon the means used by the officers to dispel their suspicions Id Chief
Hansen testified that the reason he re
moved the car to the sally port to continue
the search was for safety reasons
He
further testified that no major interrup
tions occurred during the entire search
Accordingly, the trial court's factual find
mg that the officers diligently pursued a
means of investigation that was likely to
confirm or dispel their suspicions was not
clearly erroneous
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CONSENT
[5] "A warrantless search conducted
pursuant to a consent that is voluntary in
fact does not violate the fourth amendment " State v Webb, 790 P 2d 65 (Utah
Ct App 1990) (quoting Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 US 218, 219, 93 S Ct 2041,
2043, 36 L Ed 2d 854 (1973)) Whether a
consent to a search was voluntary is a
question of fact to be determined from the
totality of all the circumstances State v
Marshall, 791 P 2d 880, 887 (Utah CtApp
1990) (citing Schneckloth, 412 U S at 227,
93 S Ct at 2047)), Webb, 790 P 2d at 82
Further, the State has the burden of showing that the consent was voluntarily given
Webb, 790 P 2d at 82, Marshall, 791 P 2d
at 887 This court has adopted the tenth
circuit's analysis for determining whether
the State has met its burden
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was "unequivocal and specific" and "freely and intelligently given", (2) the government must
prove consent was given without duress
or coercion, express or implied, and (3)
the courts indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of funda
mental constitutional rights and there
must be convincing evidence that such
rights were waived
Webb, 790 P 2d at 82 (quoting United
States v Abbott, 546 F2d 883, 885 (10th
Cir 1977)) (citations omitted)

[6,7] When Chief Hansen asked defen
dant for his consent to search the car he
replied, "go ahead and look " When asked
if his consent included a trunk and motor
compartment search, defendant replied,
"yes " When Hansen told defendant that
he intended to remove the car to the correctional facility and dismantle it bolt by bolt
if necessary, defendant replied, "go for it "
Defendant contends that his consent was
not voluntary because he was either handcuffed or in the holding area after the
initial detention However, the facts do
not support his claim When defendant
initially consented to the search, he was
neither handcuffed nor in the holding area
His consent was unequivocal and unlimited
regarding the scope of the search Later,

he told Chief Hansen that he did not want
his car dismantled At that time, the handcuffs had been removed and he had been
placed in the holding area Finally, when
defendant stated that the officers had better not tear his car apart, he was not
handcuffed or otherwise restrained
Defendant's statements about dismantling and not tearing apart his car did not
revoke his consent, they simply limited the
scope of the search to which he had previously consented Defendant was detained
while his car was searched, but the detention came after he had given his consent
The later detention did not produce coercion or duress which would preclude a finding of voluntary consent at the outset
Defendant was not informed of his right
to refuse consent While failure to inform
suspects of their right to refuse consent is
not determinative, it is a factor to be evaluated in assessing the voluntariness of a
suspect's consent Schneckloth, 412 U S
at 227, 93 S Ct at 2047 Therefore, the
officer's failure to inform defendant of his
right to refuse to consent, in and of itself,
does not indicate that defendant involuntarily consented
The trial court considered this court's
requirements as set forth in Webb and determined that defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his car The trial
court's finding on this issue was not clearly
erroneous See State v Sterger, 808 P 2d
122, 126-127, n 5 (Utah Ct App 1991)»

be determined from the totality of the circumstances " US v Espinosa, 782 F2d
888, 892 (10th Cir 1989) The trial court
found that defendant limited the scope of
the search by telling Chief Hansen not to
"dismantle" his car, and by telling Officer
Bulloch that he did not want his car torn
apart Accordingly, Chief Hansen instructed his officers not to "dismantle" defendant's car The trial court further found
that Officer Davis "did not go beyond the
scope permitted by the Defendant's consent and did not damage the car, dismantle
the car, tear the car apart, or do anything
but merely push aside an unconnected heater hose
"
The heater hose was undamped when
the search began, and it became disconnected when Officer Davis pushed it aside to
look up under the dash The hose's disconnection was not the result of stripping,
taking apart, or tearing down actions which
would indicate that Officer Davis attempted to dismantle defendant's car Further
more, no other evidence was offered to
show that Officer Davis or any of the offi
cers exceeded the scope of defendant's consent We see no error in the trial court's
finding that Officer Davis's search did not
exceed the scope of defendant's consent
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence

THE SCOPE OF THE SEARCH
[8] Defendant argues that Officer
Davis's pushing aside of the heater hose
exceeded the scope of the search to which
he consented We disagree "The scope of
a consent search is limited by the breadth
of the actual consent itself"
United
States v Gay, 774 F 2d 368, 377 (10th
Cir 1985), quoted in Marshall, 791 P 2d at
888 "Whether the search remained within
the boundaries of the consent is a fact to

BENCH and RUSSON, JJ , concur

1. We decline to follow the analytical approach
taken in State v Bobo, 803 P 2d 1268 (Utah
Ct App 1990) which creates a two part analy
sis—first a factual determination then a legal
conclusion Rather we follow Utah and federal

case law which views the question of whether
consent to a search was voluntary as a ques
Hon of fact State v Sterger, 808 P 2d at 126127 n 5 (Utah Ct App 1991)
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HALL, C J , concurs in the concurring
opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice,
concurs in the result

STATE v. MARSHALL
Cite as 791 P-2d 880 (Utah App 1990)

4 Automobiles <®=349(3)
Police officer can stop an automobile
for a traffic violation committed in the offi
cer's presence

11. Criminal Law <S=»394.5(4)
Prosecutor, as part of the State's burden to establish constitutionality of a warrantless search, must give a defendant notice that he will be put to his proof on the
issue of Fourth Amendment standing, that
can be done at any time during the hearing
on defendant's motion to suppress as long
as defendant has an opportunity to put on
evidence to meet the claim
U S CA
Const Amend 4

5. Automobiles <s=»349 5(3)
Officer may not use traffic violation
stop as a pretext to search for evidence of
a more serious crime

12. Criminal Law <S=539(2)
Defendant's testimony at motion to
suppress hearing cannot be used against
him at trial

6. Automobiles <s=>349(5), 349.5(3)
Stop of defendant's vehicle because of
malfunctioning turn signal was permissible
and was not a pretext to search for evi
dence of drug trafficking where the officer
did not become suspicious of the defendant
until after the stop

13 Criminal Law <$=*! 181.5(7)
Remand for rehearing on motion to
suppress was required where trial court
had not focused on the critical issue of the
search of suitcases in trunk of automobile

3. Arrest <&=>63.5(4)
Police officer may constitutionally stop
a citizen based on specific, articulable facts
which would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that the citizen has committed or
is about to commit a crime

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Gregory MARSHALL, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 890121-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah
April 18, 1990

Defendant appealed from order of the 7 Automobiles <3=*349(17, 18)
Seventh District Court, Sevier Countv, Don
Officer's investigatory detention of
V Tibbs, J , which denied motion to sup
motorist and request for permission to
press The Court of Appeals, Billings, J , search trunk was reasonable where motor
held that (1) stop of defendant was not ist stated that he was driving rental car on
pretextual, (2) detention of defendant after a skiing trip but the rental agreement
the stop was not unreasonable, but (3) called for the automobile to be returned to
State could not raise issue of defendant's New York five days after being rented in
standing for the first time on appeal, but California
(4) remand was required for determination
8 Criminal Law «=>1031(1)
of specific issues with respect to search of
State cannot raise issue of standing to
suitcase found in trunk of automobile
challenge search for the first time on apReversed and remanded
peal
1 Criminal Law <s=>394 6(5)
Trial court must state its findings on
the record with respect to motion to sup
press and those findings must be suffi
ciently detailed in order to allow reviewing
court the opportunity to adequately review
the decision U C A 1953, 77-35-12(c)
2 Arrest <s=>63 5(6)
Protective shield of the Fourth Amend
ment applies when an officer stops an auto
mobile on the highway and detains its occu
pants U S C A Const Amend 4

9 Searches and Seizures <s=>192
Defendant had the ultimate burden of
proof to establish that his Fourth Amend
ment rights were violated and that he had
an expectation of privacy in the area
searched or the article seized U S C A
Const Amend 4
10. Searches and Seizures <S=>23, 192
Warrantless searches are per se unrea
sonable, and burden is on the State, in first
instance, to show that a warrantless search
is lawful

14 Searches and Seizures <s=»171
Search is valid under the Fourth
Amendment if it is conducted as a result of
defendant's voluntary consent
U S CA
Const Amend 4
15. Searches and Seizures <®=»186
Even when a defendant voluntarily
consents to a search, the ensuing search
must be limited in scope to only the specific
area agreed to by the defendant
16. Searches and Seizures <s=>161
Loss of standing to challenge a search
cannot be brought about by illegal police
conduct

Jerold D McPhee and Knstme K Smith,
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appel
lant
R Paul Van Dam and Christine F Soltis,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee
Before DAVIDSON, BILLINGS and
JACKSON, JJ
•This opinion issued on Petition for Rehearing
replaces the opinion of the same name issued
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AMENDED OPINION *
BILLINGS, Judge
The appellant, Gregory J Marshall ("Mr
Marshall"), was charged with possession of
a controlled substance with the intent to
distribute for value, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann
§ 58-37-8 (1989) Mr Marshall filed a pretrial motion to suppress the 140 pounds of
marijuana seized from the rental car he
was driving when he was arrested The
trial court denied Mr Marshall's motion
and he filed this interlocutory appeal We
reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion
We recite the facts surrounding the seizure of the contraband in detail as the legal
issues presented are fact sensitive
State
v Sierra, 754 P 2d 972, 973 (Utah Ct App
1988) Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Denis Avery ("Trooper Avery") was driving on
Interstate 70 near Sahna, Utah He noticed Mr Marshall's vehicle in the left hand
lane passing a motor home
Trooper
Avery observed that Mr Marshall's turn
signal remained blinking for approximately f ^
two miles after he passed the motor home^ ^ j
Not knowing whether Mr Marshall's signa\ ~T <
was malfunctioning or whether Mr Marshall had negligently left the signal on,
Trooper Avery pulled the vehicle over to
inform Mr Marshall of the problem and to
give him a warning ticket Trooper Avery
had issued similar warning citations for
turn signal violations approximately five to
ten times in the previous six month period
Prior to stopping Mr Marshall, Trooper
Avery noticed the vehicle had California
license plates He approached Mr Mar
shall s vehicle and informed Mr Marshall
of the turn signal problem Mr Marshall
responded that he had been having "a hard
time keeping the thing turned off "
Trooper Avery asked Mr Marshall for
his driver's license and vehicle registration
Mr Marshall produced a New York driver's
license and a California rental agreement
for the vehicle Mr Marshall said he was
on December 26 1989
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going skiing in Denver and planned to return the car to San Diego, California.
However, the rental agreement indicated
that the car would be returned in New
York in five days.
Trooper Avery acknowledged he became
suspicious that Mr. Marshall might be
transporting drugs. Trooper Avery asked
Mr. Marshall to return with him to his
patrol car where he issued a warning citation for "Lights, head, tail, other." Trooper Avery then returned Mr. Marshall's driver's license and the rental agreement.
Trooper Avery next asked Mr. Marshall
if he was carrying alcohol, drugs or firearms. Mr. Marshall stated he was not.
Trooper Avery then asked Mr. Marshall if
he could "look inside the vehicle." Mr.
Marshall responded, "Go ahead." Trooper
Avery and Mr. Marshall walked back to
Mr. Marshall's vehicle. The passenger
door was locked and Mr. Marshall reached
in on the driver's side to open the door.
Trooper Avery noticed a small red bag on
the floor of the vehicle and asked if he
could open it. Mr. Marshall agreed. No
contraband was found inside the bag or the
passenger compartment of the vehicle.
Trooper Avery then asked if Mr. Marshall had a key to the trunk and if Mr.
Marshall would open the trunk. Mr. Marshall attempted to open the trunk, but was
shaking so badly that Trooper Avery had to
assist him by holding the key latch cover
up while Mr. Marshall inserted the key.
Trooper Avery saw four padlocked suitcases when Mr. Marshall opened the trunk.
Trooper Avery asked Mr. Marshall what
the suitcases contained and Mr. Marshall
responded "clothes." Trooper Avery then
asked if he could look in the suitcases. Mr.
1. Utah appellate courts have consistently required detailed findings of fact to support a
judgment entered by a trial judge in civil cases.
Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah
1979) ("The importance of complete, accurate
and consistent findings of fact in a case tried by
a judge is essential to the resolution of dispute
under the proper rule of law. To that end the
findings should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each
factual issue was reached."); Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002-03 (Utah Ct.App.1989)
(findings of fact must indicate the "mind of the

Marshall immediately reversed his statement and responded that the suitcases
were not his and must have already been in
the trunk when he rented the vehicle.
Trooper Avery testified there was some
play in the zipper of one bag and he unzipped it far enough to see a green leafy
substance. Trooper Avery then arrested
Mr. Marshall for possession of a controlled
substance.
Mr. Marshall did not testify or present
any evidence to contradict Trooper Avery's
testimony during the hearing below.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"[W]e will not disturb the trial court's
factual evaluation underlying its decision to
grant or deny a motion to suppress unless
it is clearly erroneous." State v. Sierra,
754 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah Ct.App.1988). See
also State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193
(Utah 1987); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d
326, 327 (Utah Ct.App.1989). Further,
"[t]he trial court's finding is clearly erroneous only if it is against the clear weight of
the evidence or if [the appellate court]
reachfes] a definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been made." State v. Sery,
758 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah Ct.App.1988).
[1] Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure
12(c) requires the trial court to state its
findings on the record "[wjhere factual issues are involved in determining a motion."
Those findings must be sufficiently detailed in order to allow us the opportunity
to adequately review the decision below.1
PRETEXT STOP
Initially, Mr. Marshall contends Trooper
Avery used the fact that his turn signal
court." (quoting Parks v. Zions First Nat'l Bank,
673 P.2d 590, 601 (Utah 1983)).
Detailed findings of fact likewise greatly ease
the burden of an appellate court in its review of
a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress.
This is particularly true where multiple issues
"are presented in the motion to suppress. 4 W.
LaFave, Search & Seizure § 11.2, at 252 (1987)
[hereinafter "LaFave"} (citing State v. Johnson,
16 Or.App. 560, 519 P.2d 1053. 1058-59 (1974)).
Many jurisdictions require specific findings of
fact on all motions to suppress. See LaFave at
§ 11.2 n. 188. We believe the requirement a
sound one.

was malfunctioning as a pretext to stop his
vehicle to search for evidence of drug trafficking.
[2-5] The protective shield of the
fourth amendment applies when an officer
stops an automobile on the highway and
detains its occupants. State v. Sierra, 754
P.2d 972, 975 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). A police
officer may constitutionally stop a citizen
on two alternative grounds. First, the stop
"could be based on specific, articulable
facts which, together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a
reasonable person to conclude [defendant]
had committed or was about to commit a
crime." Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1. 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889
(1968); State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408,
412 (Utah 1984); State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d
85, 88 (Utah Ct.App. 1987)). Second, the
police officer can "stop an automobile for a
traffic violation committed in the officer's
presence." Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977. However, an officer may not use a traffic violation stop as a pretext to search for evidence of a more serious crime. Id.
To determine if Trooper Avery stopped
Mr. Marshall's vehicle to investigate his
hunch that Mr. Marshall's vehicle was involved in drug trafficking, we determine
whether a hypothetical reasonable officer,
in view of the totality of the circumstances
confronting him or her, would have stopped
Mr. Marshall to issue a warning for failing
to terminate a turn signal. Id. at 978.
2. While the warning citation does not specify
which provision of the Utah Code Mr. Marshall
violated, the state asserts that his conduct was
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-117(1)
(1988) which, with our emphasis, provides:
It is a misdemeanor for any person to drive
or move or for the owner to cause or knowingly permit to be driven or moved on any
highway any vehicle or combination of vehicles which is in such unsafe condition as to
endanger any person, or which does not contain those parts or is not at all times equipped
with lamps and other equipment in proper
condition and adjustment... .
3. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660-61, 99
S.Ct. 1391, 1399-1400, 59 L.Rd.2d 660 (1979),
the United States Supreme Court stated that an
officer has a duty in the interest of highway
safety to stop vehicles for safety reasons.
"Many violations of minimum vehicle-safety requirements are observable, and something can

[6] Mr.
Marshall
claims
Trooper
Avery's stop of his vehicle is similar to the
stop we found unconstitutional in Sierra.
We disagree. In Sierra, the basis articulated for the stop was that the driver remained in the left lane too long after passing a car. In this case, Trooper Avery
perceived an equipment problem with Mr.
Marshall's „caj*^E[ther_hi^ta^
malfunctioning or he had negligently failed
to turn it off.2 Courts consistently have
held that a police officer can stop a vehicle"""
when he or she believes the vehicle's safety
equipment is not functioning properly.3
Furthermore, unlike the officer in Sierra, Trooper Avery was not suspicious of
Mr. Marshall for other reasons before the
stop, had not followed him in order to find
some reason to pull him over, and, before
the alleged violation occurred, had not radioed for help thereby indicating he intended
to stop the vehicle.
In conclusion, we find Trooper Avery's
stop of Mr. Marshall's vehicle was not a
pretext, but wasjt yajid exercise of police
authority to make certain Mr. Marshall's
vehicle was functioning properly.
UNREASONABLE DETENTION
[7] Next, Mr. Marshall complains that
the extent of his detention and the scope of
Trooper Avery's investigation exceeded
constitutional limits.4
be done about them by the observing officer,
directly and immediately." Id. at 660, 99 S.Ct.
at 1399. The Court inferred that as long as an
officer suspects the driver is violating "any one
of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations," the police officer may legally
stop the vehicle. Id. at 661, 99 S.Ct. at 1400.
See Townsel v. State, 763 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Alaska Ct.App.1988) (court held stop justified when
vehicle's headlight was out, a tail light was broken, the license plate and windows were obscured, and speeding); State v. Puig, 112 Ariz.
519, 544 P.2d 201, 202 (1975) (suspicion of defective turn signals justified stop); State v. Fuller, 556 A.2d 224, 224 (Me. 1989) (stop justified
when blinking headlights led officer to stop
vehicle for safety reasons).
4. We do not analyze this issue under article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution as the state
constitutional issue was not sufficiently particularized below nor is a reasoned analysis provid-
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"[I]n determining whether the seizure
and search were 'unreasonable' our inquiry
is a dual one—whether the officer's* action
was justified at its inception, and whether
it was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
We have previously found that Trooper
Avery's traffic stop of Mr. Marshall was
justified.
The remaining question is
whether Trooper Avery's subsequent dejtention and questioning of Mr. Marshall
was reasojmbfy related to the initial traffic
stop or was _ju_stified ^because Trooper
Avery had a reasfinahle^siispicioa to believe
Mr. Marshall was_engaged in a more serious crime. United States v. Guzman, 864
F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir.1988).

n
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ment, Mr. Marshall said he was going skiing in Colorado and planned to return the
car to San Diego, California. However, the
rental agreement, jndicated the car was to
be returned to New York in five days, the
approximate time itTakes to drive directly
from California to New York. In addition,
Mr. Marshall was driving along a wellknown drug trafficking route.
As a result of his suspicion, Trooper
Avery then asked Mr. Marshall if he was
carrying weapons, alcohol, or drugs in the
vehicle. Mr. Marshall responded he was
not. Then Trooper Avery allegedly asked
for permission to look into the vehicle and
received Mr. Marshall's consent.
The trial judge found that Trooper
Avery's "investigation was reasonable in
view of.t)ieieiendant'^^J^tem^nJs_jn_£egards to the vehicle ownership and the
driver's^ usage. The destination itinerary
would have put a reasonable officer on
notice that something was wrong." Although not directly so stating, the judge, in
substance, concluded that Trooper Avery
had reasonable suspicion to believe that
Mr. Marshall was involved in illegal conduct. Although it is a close call, we agree
with the trial court's assessment of the
reasonableness of the detention.

The United States Supreme Court has
not chosen to define a bright-line rule as to
the acceptable length of a detention because "common sense and ordinary human
experience must govern over rigid criteria." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S.
675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d
605 (1985). The Court has chosen to focus,
not on the lengtji of the detention alone,
but on "whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was
likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions
We find that Trooper Avery's questionquickly, during which time it was neces- ing of Mr. Marshall as to conduct unrelated
sary to detain the defendant." Id. at 686, to the traffic stop was justified because he
105 S.Ct. at 1575.
had reasonable suspicion to believe Mr.
Trooper Avery wrote out the warning Marshall was engaged in a more serious
citation within ten minutes of stopping Mr. crime. See Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1519.
In conclusion, based on the totality of the
Marshall and then returned Mr. Marshall's
driver's license and the vehicle rental circumstances, we agree - with the "trial
agreement. Trooper Avery claims that as court that Trooper A verves ten-minute dea result of his examination of Mr. Mar- tention and brief questioning of Mr. Marshall's driver's license and the vehicle rent- shall prior to Mr." Marshall's alleged conal agreement and his brief conversation sent to search the vehicle was not an unwith Mr. Marshall, he became suspicious reasonable detention.
that Mr. Marshall was involved in drug
trafficking. Specifically, Trooper Avery
SEARCH
points to the fact that Mr. Marshall producOn appeal, Mr. Marshall argues that
ed a New York driver's license and a Cali- even if his initial stop and subsequent defornia rental agreement for the vehicle. tention were not constitutionally deficient,
When questioned about the rental agree- the subsequent search of the trunk of the
ed on appeal as to why our analysis should be
different under Utah's* constitution. See State v.

Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct.App.
1989).
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vehicle and the suitcases found in the trunk
without a warrant violated his fourth
amendment rights. The state contends, on
the other hand, that Mr. Marshall consented to the search of the trunk and abandoned any privacy interest in the suitcases
and thus Trooper Avery's search of the
suitcases was constitutionally permissible.5
In our prior opinion, we focused solely on
whether the search of the suitcases was
proper. We found the warrantless search
of the suitcases unconstitutional as we refused to allow the state to raise the issue
of fourth amendment standing for the first
time on appeal. We granted the state's
petition for rehearing to re-examine the
related fourth amendment issues of voluntary consent and abandonment which are
central to a resolution of this appeal.
1.
Standing
The state, in its original brief on appeal,
claimed Mr. Marshall was without standing
to challenge the seizure of the suitcases as
he had disclaimed any ownership or possessory interest in the suitcases during the
search and thus had no expectation of privacy in their contents. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-50, 99 S.Ct. 421,
427-34, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); State v.
Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 1984);
State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 70, 73-75 (Utah
Ct.App.1989); State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d
194, 196-97 (Utah Ct.App.1987). The state
relies upon the following testimony from
the preliminary hearing:
5. The state does not argue that Trooper Avery
had probable cause to search either the car or
the suitcases. We, therefore, need not deal with
the troublesome issue of whether probable
cause to search an automobile is sufficient under the automobile exception to search a locked
suitcase found in the trunk of a car. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct.
2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) (if probable cause
exists, police can search closed containers found
in vehicle); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,
99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979) (warrantless search of a suitcase found in the trunk of a
taxi invalid), United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476. 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977)
(warrantless search of a footlocker found in the
trunk of a vehicle invalid); State v. Hygh, 711
P.2d 264, 272 n. 1 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman. J.,
concurring separately) (criticizing the Ross
holding).

Q. [Defense Counsel] And what was inside the trunk?
A. [Trooper Avery] There were four
suitcases.
Q. Did you ask if you could look in
those suitcases?
A. Uh huh (affirmative). First of all, I
asked him what was in the suitcases,
and he told me, right quickly, clothes.
Then when I looked at him again, he
told me that he didn't know where they
came from, they must have been in
there when he rented the car.
In our prior opinion, we relied on the
Utah Supreme Court decision of State v.
Schlosser, 114 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989),
which squarely held that standing to challenge the validity of a search under the
fourth amendment "is not a jurisdictional
doctrine [but] is a substantive doctrine that
identifies those who may assert rights
against unlawful searches and seizures."
Id. at 1138. Citing the general rule that a
substantive issue or "claim of error cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal," the
supreme court deemed the issue of standing waived. Id. at 1138-39.
The state attempts to distinguish Schlosser, claiming that in that case the state not
only failed to raise the issue of standing in
the motion to suppress hearing, but also on
appeal and that here, unlike Schlosser, the
state raises standing simply as an alternative ground to uphold the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. 6 We do not
6. Prior to Schlosser, the Utah Supreme Court
had, in several cases, considered standing for
the first time on appeal and had utilized the
doctrine to refuse to consider the constitutional
validity of a challenged search. See, e.g., State
v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 126-27 (Utah 1987)
(per curiam) (court did not address whether the
issue of standing had been raised below, but
stated that defendant could not assert any expectation of privacy in vehicle because he did
not own vehicle and had presented no testimony that he had permission of owner or had
boi rowed vehicle "under circumstances that
would imply permissive use"). State v. lacono,
725 P.2d 1375, 1377-78 (Utah 1986) (State below
argued there was consent by defendant's ex-wife
to search his mother's trailer. On appeal, the
state argued defendant had no possessory or
proprietary interest in the trailer and thus had
no expectation of privacy. The court declined
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find the distinction determinative. 7

raise standing for the first time on appeal.
The United States Supreme Court took We disagree. The language in Rakas rethe same position in Steagald v. United lied upon by the state is consistent with our
States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 view.
L.Ed.2d 38 (1981), when it refused to allow
The proponent of a motion to suppress
the government to raise the issue of fourth
has the burden of establishing that his
amendment standing for the first time on
own Fourth Amendment rights were vioappeal to provide an alternative ground to
lated by the challenged search or seizure.
sustain the trial court's refusal to grant a
The prosecutor argued that petitioners
motion to suppress. The Court concluded:
lacked standing to challenge the search
Aside from arguing that a search warbecause they did not own the rifle, the
rant was not constitutionally required,
shells or the automobile. Petitioners
the Government was initially entitled to
did not contest the factual predicates of
defend against petitioner's charge of an
the prosecutors argument and instead,
unlawful search by asserting that petisimply stated that they were not retioner lacked a reasonable expectation of
quired to prove ownership to object to
privacy in the searched home, or that he
consented to the search, or that exigent
the search. The prosecutor's argument
circumstances justified the entry. The
gave petitioners notice that they were
Government,
however, may lose its
to be put to their proof on any issue as
right to raise factual issues of this sort
to which they had the burden, and bebefore this Court when it has made concause of their failure to assert ownertrary assertions in the courts below,
ship, we must assume, for purposes of
when it has acquiesced in contrary findour review, that petitioners do not own
ings by those courts, or when it has
the rifle or the shells.
failed to raise such questions in a timeId. at 130 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. at 424 n. 1 (citations
ly fashion during the litigation.
omitted)
(emphasis added).
Id. at 209, 101 S.Ct. at 1646 (emphasis
added).
[9,10] We agree with the state and Rakas that Mr. Marshall has the ultimate
[8] The state, on petition for rehearing, burden of proof to establish that his fourth
contends that language in Rakas v. Illi- amendment rights were violated or, to put
nois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d it otherwise, that he had an expectation of
387 (1978), is contrary to our conclusion
privacy in the area searched or the articles
that the state should not be allowed to
seized.8
Nevertheless,
warrantless
to reach the issue of consent because it found
that defendant lacked standing to object to the
search because the stipulated evidence did not
show that defendant shared ownership, use or
possession of the trailer.); State v. Valdez, 689
P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 1984) (At trial, the defendant produced evidence that neither the attache
case in which the evidence was found nor the
vehicle belonged to the defendant. The court
did not address whether the issue of standing
was raised below, but declined to reach the
question of the validity of the search because
the defendant conceded he did not own the case
or the vehicle and had failed to show any expectation of privacy.). In these earlier cases, it is
sometimes unclear whether the Utah Supreme
Court raised the issue of standing sua sponte on
appeal or permitted the state to raise the issue
of standing for the first time on appeal. We
assume that Schlosser supercedes these earlier
cases and thus do not follow them.
7. Although the Utah Supreme Court refused to
allow standing to be utilized to attack the trial

Utah 887

Cite a« 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1990)

court's granting of a motion to suppress in
Schlosser, the court relied on State v. Goodman,
42 Wash.App. 331, 711 P.2d 1057 (1985). which
held the state could not raise the issue of standing for the first time on appeal to provide an
alternative ground for sustaining the trial
court's denial of a motion to suppress. Id. 711
P.2d at 1060.
8. However, the failure of the state to challenge
Mr. Marshall's standing at the suppression hearing did not give Mr. Marshall an opportunity to
assert his expectation of privacy. See Combs v.
United States, 408 U.S. 224, 227-28, 92 S.Ct.
2284. 2286. 33 L.Ed.2d 308 (1972) (per curiam)
(Where petitioner's failure to assert an expectation of privacy may have been explained by the
Government's failure to challenge standing either at the suppression hearing or at trial, the
United States Supreme Court remanded to the
district court for further proceedings to allow
petitioner to establish a privacy interest.).

searches are per se unreasonable and the
burden is on the state, in the first instance,
to show that a warrantless search is lawful. State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408,
411 (Utah 1984).
[11,12] We believe Rakas is consistent
with our view that the prosecutor, as part
of the state's burden to establish the constitutionality of a warrantless search, must
give a defendant "notice that he will be put
to his p r o o f on the issue of fourth amendment standing. This can be done at any
time during the hearing on a defendant's
motion to suppress as long as the defendant has an opportunity to put on evidence
to meet the claim.9 Once the defendant
has been put on notice that the state claims
the warrantless search was constitutional
because he has no expectation of privacy in
the area searched, then the defendant must
factually demonstrate that he does have
standing to contest the warrantless search.
We believe the Schlosser standing rule was
fashioned to protect the defendant from
being required to deal with new legal issues on appeal when he had no warning of
the necessity to develop the relevant facts
below.
2.

Consent/Abandonment

The state, on petition for rehearing, excuses its failure to raise the issue of standing claiming that neither Mr. Marshall, the
state nor the trial judge focused on the
search of the suitcases in the motion to
suppress hearing. Rather, the state claims
the hearing centered on the pretextual nature of the stop, the unreasonable detention of Mr. Marshall and the unlawful
search of the trunk.
Mr. Marshall, on petition for rehearing,
claims the following comment made by defense counsel sufficiently focused the proceeding on the search of the suitcases:
9. The defendant's testimony at the motion to
suppress hearing cannot be used against the
defendant at trial. See Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 394, 88 S.Ct. 967, 976, 19
L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968) (prosecutor cannot use a
defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing
as substantive evidence of guilt at trial unless
defendant makes no objection). We note, how-

"Additionally there is no evidence that
there was consent to search the bags."
[13] Upon a re-examination of the
record, we agree with the state that the
parties and the trial judge did not focus on
the critical issue of the search of the suitcases at the motion to suppress hearing.
The result is that the trial judge did not
make adequate findings of fact on the issues of voluntary consent to search the
trunk or the suitcases and Mr. Marshall's
alleged abandonment of any privacy interest in the suitcases, which the parties now
agree are pivotal on appeal. We therefore
remand for a rehearing on these critical
issues. We nevertheless discuss the controlling law to guide the trial court on
rehearing.
[14] A search is valid under the fourth
amendment if it is conducted as a result of
the
defendant's
voluntary
consent.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854
(1973); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980
(Utah Ct.App.1988). "[T]he question [of]
whether a consent to a search was in fact
'voluntary' or was the product of duress or
coercion, express or implied, is a question
of fact to be determined from the totality
of all the circumstances."
Schneckloth,
412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. at 2047-48. "A
trial court's finding of voluntary consent
will not be reversed unless it is clearly
erroneous." United States v. Miller, 589
F.2d 1117, 1130 (1st Cir.1978), cert, denied,
440 U.S. 958, 99 S.Ct. 1499, 59 L.Ed.2d 771
(1979).
In United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883
(10th Cir.1977), the Tenth Circuit outlined
the specifics necessary for the government
to sustain its burden to show that voluntary consent was given:
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was "unequivocal
and specific" and "freely and intelligentever, that the United States Supreme Court had
not decided whether the Simmons rule precludes the use of a defendant's suppression
hearing testimony to impeach the defendant's
testimony at trial. See United States v. Salvucci,
448 U.S. 83. 94 & n. 9, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 2554 & n.
9, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980).
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ly given"; (2) the government must
prove consent was given without duress
or coercion, express or implied; and (3)
the courts indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there
must be convincing evidence that such
rights were waived.
Id. at 885 (quoting Villano v. United
States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir.1962)).
See also United States v. Recalde, 761
F.2d 1448, 1453 (10th Cir.1985). See generally State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103,
106 (Utah 1980); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d
972, 980-81 (Utah Ct.App.1988).
[15] Even when a defendant voluntarily
consents to a search, the ensuing search
must be limited in scope to only the specific
area agreed to by defendant. "The scope
of a consent search is limited by the
breadth of the actual consent itself....
Any police activity that transcends the actual scope of the consent given encroaches
on the Fourth Amendment rights of the
suspect." United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d
368, 377 (10th Cir.1985); see, e.g., People v.
Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 201 (Colo.1984) (scope
of consent exceeded when police asked to
"look around" the house, then conducted a
45-minute search of rooms, drawers, boxes
and closed containers).
The trial court made the following conelusory finding on the issue of Mr. Marshall's consent: "The Defendant consented
to the search. There was no evidence of
duress or coercion." This conclusory finding on consent is not particularly helpful in
determining whether Mr. Marshall's consent was "unequivocal and specific" as it
does not detail what Mr. Marshall agreed
could be searched—the interior of the passenger compartment, the trunk, or the
locked suitcases. 10 Furthermore, the relevant portions from the transcript of Trooper Avery's testimony are troubling:
Q. [Defense Counsel] What were the
words he [sic] used when you asked
him to search his vehicle?
10. See supra note 1 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the importance of detailed find-

A. [Trooper Avery] I asked Mr. Marshall if—if there were any—if there
was any—were there any drugs in the
vehicle, and he took two or three seconds—no, wait a minute, I guess—I
first asked him if he was carrying any
weapons and he told me no. I then
asked him if he was carrying any—if
there was any alcohol in the vehicle, he
said that he did not drink. I recall
both answers were quite quick. And
then I asked him if there were any
drugs in the vehicle, he paused for,
you know, probably two or three seconds, and then told me no. I then
asked him if it would be okay if I
looked in the vehicle, search the vehicle, and he said go ahead.
Q. Now, did you ask if you could look in
the vehicle, or did you ask if you could
search the vehicle?
A. Well, according to this [his report], I
said—I asked if I could look in the
vehicle.
Q. So, it was "look in the vehicle"?
You didn't ask if you could open anything inside the vehicle or anything
else, did you?
A. No. I just asked if I could look in
the vehicle.
Q. And what happened then?
A. Mr. Marshall just told me, you know,
he said go right ahead. He got out,
gathered up his papers and we walked
up to the front of the vehicle, and he
had to open the passenger door, as I
recall.
Q. And how did you get in the trunk?
A. I asked him, I said—asked him if he
had the key to the trunk and he says
yes, and I says—and I asked him if
he'[d] open it, which he did, he tried.
He was extremely nervous at the time.
I—
Q. So did you open the trunk?
A. No, sir, I did not. He—he could
not—there was a little latch over the
key hole. He was shaking so hard, he
ings on a motion to suppress.

couldn't even hold the latch open, so I
held the latch up for him so he could
insert the key.
Without the assistance of specific findings of fact, we cannot resolve the difficult
issue of whether Mr. Marshall's opening
the trunk constituted implied consent to
search the trunk under the totality of the
circumstances presented.
See
United
States v. Almand, 565 F.2d 927, 930 (5th
Cir.), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 824, 99 S.Ct. 92,
58 L.Ed.2d 116 (1978) (voluntary consent
found where defendant silently reached
into his pocket, removed key, then unlocked
and opened camper door).
Furthermore, the record creates a substantial question as to whether the court's
general finding that there was "no evidence of duress or coercion" was intended
to apply to the search of the trunk or, even
if it was, whether the finding is consistent
with the standard required for a voluntary
consent. See United States v. Abbott, 546
F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir.1977); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980-81 (Utah Ct.App.
1988). Likewise, the court in its findings
fails to focus on the search of the locked
suitcases and the issues of voluntary consent or abandonment.
[16] Even if we were to accept the
state's argument that the undisputed facts
support a finding that Mr. Marshall abandoned u any expectation of privacy in the
suitcases by his ambiguous disclaimer of
ownership and that the state should be
allowed to raise this fourth amendment
standing issue for the first time on appeal,
we would be unable to dispose of this case
on the record before us. The state, in its
petition for rehearing, correctly points out
II. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d
1169, 1173 (10th Ctr.1983) (Court found abandonment when police initially saw defendant
running with a brown satchel, however, when
they captured defendant, he did not have the
satchel and disavowed knowledge of it. Police
later found the satchel outside the building and
searched it.); United States v. Kendall, 655 F.2d
199, 202 (9th Cir. 1981). cert, denied, 455 U.S.
941, 102 S.Ct. 1434. 71 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982) (court
found abandonment where the defendant, after
picking up the luggage at the claim area, produced a mismatched baggage claim check, told
agents that his name was not on the luggage

that "a loss of standing to challenge a
search cannot be brought about by illegal
police conduct." United States v. Labat,
696 F.Supp. 1419, 1425 (D.Kan.1988).
Thus, we would have to determine if the
search of the trunk was illegal or was a
result of a voluntary consent. This we
cannot do on the record before us.
Even if we determined the search of the
trunk was unlawful, the "defendant must
show a nexus between the allegedly unlawful police conduct and the abandonment of
the property." Id. at 1426. See, e.g., United States v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041 (6th
Cir.1982), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 933, 104
S.Ct. 337, 78 L.Ed.2d 306 (1983) (While "an
unconstitutional seizure or arrest which
prompts a disclaimer of property vitiates
that act," id. at 1045, the court found the
defendant's disclaimer was not precipitated
by improper conduct. Id. at 1048.); United
States v. Oilman, 684 F.2d 616, 620 (9th
Cir.1982) ("There must be a nexus between
the allegedly unlawful police conduct and
abandonment of property if the challenged
evidence is to be suppressed."); United
States v. Beck, 602 F.2d 726, 730 (5th Cir.
1979) (if there is a nexus between unlawful
police conduct and the discovery of evidence, the court should suppress the evidence). See generally Search and Seizure: What Constitutes Abandonment of
Personal Property
within Rule
that
Search and Seizure of Abandoned Property Is Not Unreasonable—Modern Cases,
40 A.L.R.4th 381 (1985). Again, there is no
finding on this crucial issue.
Therefore, we reverse and remand this
interlocutory appeal for a rehearing on Mr.
Marshall's motion to suppress on the limited issues of whether Mr. Marshall volunname tag, and allowed the agents to return the
luggage to the claim area, thus giving the agents
the impression that he had no interest in the
luggage); United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217,
1220-21 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 456 U.S.
946, 102 S.Ct. 2013, 72 L.Ed.2d 469 (1982) (court
found abandonment where the defendant disclaimed ownership of a wallet found on the seat
of the vehicle); United States v. Colbert, 474
F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (court
found abandonment when defendants disclaimed ownership of suitcases and began to
walk away from them).
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tanly consented to the search of the trunk
or the suitcases, whether Mr Marshall have been suggestive, there was adequate
independent basis for identification
abandoned any privacy interest in the suit
cases and thus lacks standing to challenge 2 Criminal Law 0=1169 5(2)
their search, and finally, if the trial court
Any error attributed to alleged mis
finds there was an illegal search of the
identification of defendant by witness at
trunk or suitcases, whether there is a suffi
trial was cured by detailed jury instruction
cient nexus between that illegal search and
Mr Marshall's abandonment, if any, of his which properly apprised jury of inherent
limitations of eyewitness identification
expectation of privacy in the suitcases
3 Criminal Law <S=*419(1, 5)
Hearsay statements of witness are ad
DAVIDSON and JACKSON, JJ,
concur
missible at trial provided that State can
show witness' unavailability and prove that
statement bears adequate indicia of rehabil
| *^^M*WT{M>
ity U S C A Const Amend 6, Const Art
1, § 12, Rules of Evid, Rule 804(a)(5)
4 Criminal Law «S=»419(5)
State showed unavailability of witness
es, as required for witnesses' statements to
be admissible under unavailable witness ex
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
ception to hearsay rule, State subpoenaed
v
each witness several times, attempted to
Johnny Wade DRAWN, Defendant
make personal contact, and used mfor
and Appellant
mants and other police resources to locate
them, all of which proved unsuccessful
No. 890253-CA.
U S C A Const Amend 6, Const Art 1,
Court of Appeals of Utah
§ 12, Rules of Evid, Rule 804(a)(5)
5 Criminal Law <s»419(5)
May 2, 1990
Statements of unavailable witnesses
had sufficient indicia of reliability to war
Defendant was convicted in the Third rant admission under unavailable witness
District Court, Salt Lake County, David S
exception to hearsay rule, statements of
Young, of aggravated robbery Defendant witnesses were made against their penal
appealed The Court of Appeals, Davidson, interests, their statements were substan
J , held that (1) trial court did not abuse tially similar, and other evidence corroboits discretion in admitting witness' in court rated portions of statements
USCA
identification testimony, (2) hearsay state
Const Amend 6, Rules of Evid, Rules
ments were properly admitted under un
804(a)(5), 804(b)(3)
available witness exception, and (3) defen
dant's sentence was permissibly enhanced 6 Criminal Law «=>1208 6(4)
for use of firearm
Aggravated robbery defendant's sen
tence was permissibly enhanced for use of
Affirmed
firearm
1 Criminal Law «S=*339 9(3)
Trial court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting salesperson's in court identifi
cation of shoe store robbery defendant,
even though witness had previously failed
to identify defendant at line up, while de
fendant's presence at counsel table may
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Before DAVIDSON, BILLINGS and
0RME, JJ
DAVIDSON, Judge
Defendant appeals his conviction of ag
gravated robbery He argues that the trial
court erred by failing to suppress a wit
ness's in court identification of defendant,
by admitting hearsay statements of un
available witnesses, and by enhancing his
sentence for the use of a firearm We
affirm
On August 21, 1988, a man entered the
Payless Shoe Store located in Magna, Utah,
wearing pink and beige colored nylon
stockings over his head and carrying a
sawed off shotgun
Two salespersons
were working at the time The man or
dered one salesperson to hand over all the
money in the register and the other sales
person to take all the money out of the safe
and place it in a corduroy bag The sales
person working at the register testified
that she was looking at the man's face "the
whole time " The second salesperson only
viewed the man briefly
After the robbery, a woman driving
through the mall parking lot observed a
man wearing something pink on his head,
running alongside the Payless Shoe Store
attempting to shove something into a bag
The witness observed the man enter a
small white station wagon driven by a
black woman and watched the car exit the
parking lot heading southbound on 5600
West and later turning west on 3500 South
She reported this information to the police
after discovering that the shoe store had
been robbed She later identified the car
after the police had detained the car and its
occupants
Several blocks from the robbery, a
fourth witness observed a light skinned
black man exit a white compact station
wagon Several minutes later, he observed
a police officer pull the station wagon over
and handcuff the vehicle's two remaining
female occupants After observing this, he
drove down the road where he observed the
same black man The witness lost sight of
the man for about fifteen or twenty mm
utes, but later observed the same man

wearing different clothing The witness
thereafter lost sight of the black man
West Valley City Police Officer Kory
Newbold responded to the Payless robbery
While driving to Payless he observed a
possible suspect vehicle travelling in the
opposite direction
The officer turned
around, and pursued the vehicle He mo
mentanly lost sight of the vehicle but later
found it on a side street and pulled it over
He questioned the two black female occu
pants, but released them because they did
not match the reported description Upon
returning to the patrol car, the officer re
ceived updated information on the suspects
and getaway vehicle
With this knowl
edge, he again pulled the vehicle over and
this time arrested the occupants
At the arrest scene, one witness identi
fied the car as the getaway vehicle, another
recognized one of the women suspects as
having been in the shoe store earlier in the
day The bag of money and the shotgun
used in the robbery were also found near
the scene of arrest At the police station,
the two suspects were interviewed by De
tective Ron Edwards of the West Valley
City Police Department
Detective Ed
wards later testified that both women ad
mitted that they waited m the car while
defendant robbed the shoe store Edwards
also testified that both women told him
that after the robbery they momentarily
evaded police, let defendant out, and threw
the money bag and gun out the window
Neither woman testified at trial Instead,
their testimony was admitted through De
tective Edwards under the unavailability
exception to the hearsay rule See Utah
REvid 804
Defendant was arrested the day after
the robbery and was questioned by Detec
tive Edwards Detective Edwards later
testified that defendant confessed to the
robbery after asking defendant's parole of
ficer and another police officer to leave the
interrogation room Neither the testimony
of the two women nor defendant's testimo
ny was recorded
Two lineups were held several weeks af
ter the robbery None of the witnesses
brought to the lineup could identify defen

